Can my employer "hear" my SKYPE phone calls

Discussion in 'VOIP' started by Susan, Jul 20, 2006.

  1. Susan

    Leythos Guest

    I don't believe this for a second. We work with people 12 hours away,
    some are 9 some are 14 hours difference to our time zone.

    If you want to talk, don't do it at work - that's abuse of your
    companies network services and in the US it can get you fired. Don't
    think they can't detect it, it's a bright light when watching the
    firewall.

    When I work overseas I call my wife and she takes the call at 3AM her
    time (depending on my schedule), I take the calls at my sleeping hours.
    If you care enough about the person you can do the same.
     
    Leythos, Jul 23, 2006
    #61
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  2. I don't know where you are (and don't need to), but in California they've
    gotten the pay-phone situation sorted out such that you can plunk in 50 cents
    and talk locally for unlimited time. You might be able to find a pay phone
    near work that you can use on your lunch hour, call your friend collect, and
    settle up when you are able to get together. In that case, you wouldn't need
    to carry a lot of coins.

    It's not a very convenient method, but it should work.

    I presume that writing letters on paper and exchanging them via snail mail
    would /not/ work?

    Just pointing out some alternatives.

    Chris
     
    Christopher P. Winter, Jul 23, 2006
    #62
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  3. Susan

    Jim Holcomb Guest

    Jim Holcomb, Jul 23, 2006
    #63
  4. He doesn't *supposedly* know it, he does know it, and you just confirmed
    that you once worked there.

    If you're so concerned about privacy, you should have considered that
    your email address is traceable.

    Now, if your spouse decides to google you, he's going to know all about
    what you're up to, as will your employer.

    Bad luck, that.

    rl
     
    Rhonda Lea Kirk, Jul 23, 2006
    #64
  5. Susan

    Al Klein Guest

    I think he was just showing you that "anonymous" died a long time ago.
     
    Al Klein, Jul 23, 2006
    #65
  6. I like my privacy too. It just doesn't really exist any more unless
    we are talking about a fact-to-face chat. The problem is that all the
    call data is being collected and anyone that badly wants access can
    get it by subpoenaing the appropriate phone companies.
    Personally, I just use normal unencrypted voip between two voip
    phones, but then I don't have to worry about some employer objecting
    to the slightly increased network usage.

    -wolfgang
     
    Wolfgang S. Rupprecht, Jul 23, 2006
    #66
  7. Susan

    Susan Guest

    Hi Jeremy,

    You seem to be a rare voice of technical reason here. Instead of going into
    the easy moralification of personal issues (which is trivially easy to
    pontify cowardly from behind the moral safety of a computer keyboard), you
    provide sensible answers to the purely technical questions of enhancing
    privacy in personal communications.

    I'm appalled at how much is known about me (things I've forgotten about
    even) from people I don't even know.

    May I ask is whether I can post to this newsgroup more privately.
    Apparently there is a record stored of my posts even ten years ago.

    Is there a way to post to the usenet such that my posts aren't traceable
    back to me ten years later? Is there some freeware that will "anonymize" my
    email address (I'm not worried about my first name, which is a nickname
    anyway but I want to anonymize my email address and IP).

    Thank you in advance,
    Susan
     
    Susan, Jul 23, 2006
    #67
  8. Susan

    Susan Guest

    Is this all you can offer to the technical discussion of securing a modicum
    of privacy in Internet voice over IP communications?

    Susan
     
    Susan, Jul 23, 2006
    #68
  9. Susan

    Leythos Guest

    Even ten years ago you could use a proxy to post through, but the proxy
    has your identity in most cases. So, while you can "appear" to be
    anonymous, if you were posting, as many have found, you can't really be
    anonymous, but you can get close.
     
    Leythos, Jul 23, 2006
    #69
  10. Susan

    jeremy Guest

    In a word: Yes.

    http://anonymouse.org/anonnews.html

    You will not be able to pick your own name--they will assign one of several
    that they use--but you CAN post anonymously and you can receive replies via
    the newsgroup you posted in.

    No software is required--it works through your browser.

    There are other options available to you, but this one is by far the
    simplest. And you do not have to sign up with them, so there is no record
    of who the originating poster is.

    I also recommend www.anonymizer.com to keep your ISP from knowing where you
    browse. They cannot turn over your records to anyone if they do not exist.
    The service costs $30/year and it also filters out lots of malware from
    downloading into your computer. I've used it for years, and wouldn't be
    without it.
     
    jeremy, Jul 23, 2006
    #70
  11. Susan

    JoeSmithIII Guest

    Susan said
    I use COTSE (cotse.net).
    URL: https://www.cotse.net/home.html
    USENET: alt.cotse

    I have XNEWS set up to post responses (like this) through their remailer.
    It's totally painless and quite private.
    https://www.cotse.net/home.html

    I do this on a group by group basis. So some groups list me fake name and
    valid IP. Others (like this group) get my other fake name :)-]) and no
    IP.

    "I" don't even know who I am anymore. ;-)

    You can also use QuickSilver for free. But the COTSE remailer is less
    hassle.

    Joe Smith III


    -=-
    This message was sent via two or more anonymous remailing services.
     
    JoeSmithIII, Jul 23, 2006
    #71
  12. Susan

    Ivor Jones Guest

    Especially when they don't munge their email addresses on usenet.

    Ivor
     
    Ivor Jones, Jul 23, 2006
    #72
  13. Susan

    Ivor Jones Guest

    You are not entitled to privacy whilst using your employer's equipment and
    bandwidth.

    Ivor
     
    Ivor Jones, Jul 23, 2006
    #73
  14. Susan

    Sue Guest

    In line with the claims of its creators, Skype appears to encrypt or
    otherwise scramble information that is transmitted over the Internet.
    Although it is generally accepted that Skype is secure against casual
    snooping, it is not clear how it would fare against sophisticated
    attackers.

    The security of any data sent over an encrypted connection depends upon
    many factors, including the specific encryption algorithms used and how
    encryption keys are chosen or exchanged (known as key management). Also of
    critical importance is the protocol that employs the algorithms, and how
    well both the algorithms and protocols are implemented. An analysis of the
    packets sent between Skype clients indicates that a combination of
    protocols appear to be used for actions such registering oneself on the
    network, searching for other participants, or making a voice telephone
    call.

    Skype claims that its system employs RSAÿs encryption for key exchange and
    256-bit AES as its bulk encryption algorithm. However, Skype does not
    publish its key exchange algorithm or its over-the-wire protocol. Despite
    repeated requests, Skype refuses to explain the underlying design of its
    certificates, authentication system, or encryption implementation. It is
    therefore impossible to validate the company's claims regarding encryption.
    A poor implementation of the RSA algorithm could provide encryption, but no
    actual security.

    In order to avoid detection, many peer-to-peer applications, including
    Skype, change the port that they use each time they start. Consequently,
    there is no standard "Skype port" like there is a "SIP port" or "SMTP
    port". In addition, Skype is particularly adept at port-hopping with the
    aim of traversing enterprise firewalls. Entering via UDP, TCP, or even TCP
    on port 80, Skype is usually very successful at passing typical firewalls.
    Once inside, it then intentionally connects to other Skype clients and
    remains connected, maintaining a ´virtual circuit¡. If one of those clients
    happens to be infected, then the machines that connect to it can be
    infected with no protection from the firewall. Moreover, because Skype has
    the ability to port-hop, it is much harder to detect anomalous behavior or
    configure network security devices to block the spread of the infection.

    Like its file sharing predecessor Kazaa, Skype employs an overlay
    peer-to-peer network. There are two types of nodes in this overlay network,
    ordinary hosts and super nodes. An ordinary host is a Skype application
    that can be used to place voice calls, send text messages, etc. A super
    node is an ordinary hostÿs end-point on the Skype network, meaning that any
    ordinary host must first connect to a super node and authenticate itself
    with the Skype login server. Any node with a public IP address having
    sufficient CPU, memory, and network bandwidth is a candidate to become a
    super node - including machines that reside on enterprise networks. Because
    Skype super nodes are created dynamically, and could conceivably consume as
    much bandwidth as is available to them, enterprise IT managers consider
    these super nodes a significant risk to the health of their network.

    Privacy and Authenticity

    When you initiate a Skype conversation, how sure are you that you are
    actually reaching the user that you specified? Every Skype user has a
    username and a password. It appears that the network is used by Skype to
    perform username/password verification, but it isnÿt clear how this is
    done. For example, hosts on the Skype network could relay the encrypted
    username/password combination back to Skypeÿs servers for approval.
    Alternatively, they could relay an unencrypted username/password
    combination. If the Skype network is indeed involved in the communications,
    several types of attacks may be possible:

    A malicious Skype client may learn the username/password combination of
    registered Skype users;

    If a Skype user accesses the Skype network through a malicious Internet
    Service Provider, the ISP may direct that userÿs Skype communications to
    the malicious Skype node. Thus, it may be possible for a malicious ISP to
    learn any of their userÿs Skype passwords;

    A malicious node may fake a valid authentication, allowing a client to log
    in with a particular Skype username even though the password for that
    username is not known.

    When using Skype as a voice communications system, its users can often rely
    on identifying a person by the sound of their voice. This layer is absent,
    however, if Skype is used only for text messaging and exchanging files.
    These challenges are forcing carriers to look for accurate ways to detect
    Skype (and other P2P protocols). In some cases the telecom Marketing
    departments are highly interested in what percentage of their customers are
    using Skype so that they can decide whether or not to launch their own
    commercial VoIP service. In other cases, unpredictable bandwidth
    consumption and security issues are concerning enterprise IT managers- the
    customers of the telecom carrier. Many of these enterprise IT managers are
    responding by requiring that the carrier actually block Skype traffic
    before it hits their private networks.

    Challenges In Detection of Skype Traffic

    In general, effective Internet traffic detection and classification
    requires three key elements:

    1.Accuracy: the technique should have low false positive (identifying
    other protocols as targeted protocol X);

    2.Scalability: the technique must be able to process large traffic
    volumes in the order of several hundred thousands to several million
    connections at a time, with good accuracy, and yet not be computationally
    expensive;

    3.Robustness: traffic measurement in the middle of the network has to
    deal with the effects of asymmetric routing (two directions of a connection
    follow different paths), packet losses and reordering.

    There are usually tradeoffs in terms of the level of accuracy, scalability
    and robustness that can be achieved relative to the detection of any given
    protocol or service.

    One current classification practice consists of TCP/UDP port number
    application identification using known TCP/UDP port numbers to identify
    traffic flows. This method is highly scalable since only the TCP/UDP port
    numbers must be recorded to identify a particular application. It is also
    highly robust since a single packet is sufficient to make a successful
    identification. Unfortunately port number-based identification is
    increasingly inaccurate primarily due to the fact that P2P networks tend to
    intentionally disguise their generated traffic in order to circumvent
    filtering firewalls (as well as legal issues associated with organizations
    like the Recording Industry Association of America). Most P2P networks now
    operate on top of custom-designed proprietary protocols and their clients
    can easily operate on any port number - even HTTPÿs port 80, making
    port-based detection schemes incapable of accurate and robust
    classification of Internet protocols.

    To overcome the issues with port-based detection, a new technique has
    emerged based on payload-signature methods. Using this technique,that
    processes packet payloads for patterns or signatures that univocally
    identify any given protocol. One challenge facing payload-signature
    techniques on telecom networks is the high speed at which such pattern
    matching algorithms must be executed, e.g. 2.5Gbps (OC48) and above. It is
    therefore critical to design algorithms that can efficiently perform
    pattern matching while simultaneously dealing with memory and CPU
    limitations. Another key challenge is the lack of openly available,
    reliable protocol specifications. This is partially due to developmental
    history and partially a result of the proprietary nature of many protocols.
    For example, most P2P protocols are both proprietary and constantly
    evolving. Some of these (Gnutella for instance) provide some documentation,
    but it is often incomplete, or not up-to-date. To make matters worse, there
    are various implementations of Gnutella clients, some of which do not
    comply with the specifications in the documentation (raising potential
    inter-operability issues). For application detection and classification to
    be accurate, it is important to identify signatures that span all the
    variants (or at least the dominantly used ones). However, it is
    increasingly common to see new applications (such as Skype or GCN)
    employing 128-bit or 256-bit encryption techniques to defend the privacy of
    the information exchanged between their users. As a consequence, the
    payload-signature method fails when traffic is encrypted, because the
    signatures in the packet payload are scrambled by the encryption.

    Skype offers a combination of challenges that make it notoriously difficult
    to detect with scalable, accurate algorithms:

    The Skype agent does not run on any standard source port. Skype
    randomly selects a source port for the agent to run on, then communicates
    via either TCP or UDP, or both. The choice of the protocol that Skype uses
    depends on whether the agent is behind a proxy/NAT or has a public IP
    address. The destination IP addresses are not the same every time Skype
    runs, and the destination port numbers are also not standard.

    All communication via Skype is encrypted. This also means that phone
    numbers called (SkypeOut) or other data are also encrypted. In many cases,
    there is no direct communication between end users in Skype. All
    communication passes through intermediate nodes, and these nodes may be
    different for every call.

    Skype is a peer-to-peer protocol, which means that the peers (IP
    addresses) to which a Skype agent connects are many and the network is very
    dynamic, so these peers (and thus their IP addresses) keep changing.

    Skype provides voice, chat, file transfer and video services. It
    appears that all of these services are passed together, making it difficult
    to separate out voice, from chat, from video, etc.

    To accurately detect and classify these unfriendly applications, it is
    necessary to provide a systematic methodology that overcomes the lack of
    well-known port numbers or user payload signatures. Instead, any new
    methodology should analyze flow connections at the transport layer (Layer
    4) to extract and profile key features from the packet streams processed.
    Such a method could be referred to as ´classification in the dark¡.
     
    Sue, Jul 24, 2006
    #74
  15. Susan

    Bill Kearney Guest

    Yes. Modicum of privacy is bullshit. You're expecting to abuse your
    employer's time and network so you can engage in a clandestine relationship.
    Wake up, and get back to work before you get fired and/or ruin the lives of
    everyone unfortunate enough to be tangled up in your mess.
     
    Bill Kearney, Jul 25, 2006
    #75
  16. Susan

    Ivor Jones Guest

    [snip]

    Irrelevant.

    You are not entitled to privacy whilst using your employer's equipment and
    bandwidth.

    Ivor
     
    Ivor Jones, Jul 25, 2006
    #76
  17. Susan

    DevilsPGD Guest

    In message <> "Ivor Jones"
    That really depends on where you live. You may not, and if not, I do
    feel sorry for you.
     
    DevilsPGD, Jul 29, 2006
    #77
  18. Susan

    Ivor Jones Guest

    It depends on nothing. Your employer is paying for the equipment and
    bandwidth; what makes you think you are entitled to any degree of privacy
    whatever whilst using it for purposes unrelated to your employment..?

    I don't need you to feel sorry for me, I do not consider the above to be
    unfair. If you want to feel sorry for someone, do so for those who are
    having to pay people while they aren't working.

    Ivor
     
    Ivor Jones, Jul 29, 2006
    #78
  19. Susan

    DevilsPGD Guest

    In message <> "Ivor Jones"
    Well, the law in many jurisdictions would not agree. Regardless of who
    paid for the equipment, the user may still have rights.
    Well, my employee handbook specifically states that during my lunch,
    break, before and after work, and during other appropriate times (as
    determined by my immediate supervisor) I may use company phones for
    non-billable calls, and use the company PC for personal activities, as
    long as those activities do not interfere with corporate activities.

    We're also allowed to use the chairs to sit on during our breaks, the
    lights to read a book during our breaks, the filtered and air
    conditioned air to breath during our off hours.
    *shrugs* I have an employer that realizes that happy employees are
    productive employees. My employer shut down early last Friday to take
    the entire group out on the lake, including supplying food and drink.

    In December, the whole company is being flown to Vegas for a vacation.

    This weekend, the entire technical support staff volunteered (not "was
    encouraged to volunteer because otherwise we'd lose our jobs", but
    honest-to-god offered) to come in and get us caught up because we're
    backlogged.

    It trickles down -- You treat me like a human, with respect, and let me
    enjoy my work, I'll go above and beyond as well.

    Counter that with my previous employer, call center position who one day
    decided that even if you're late leaving for a break you have to be back
    on time. I went to my manager and asked if we were supposed to place
    the customer on hold when our breaks start, transfer the call back into
    the queue, or hang up on them -- If an employer pushes, the employees
    push back and in the end, all it does is hurt the customer.

    As I said, if your employer treats you like a liability rather then an
    asset, I feel sorry for you.
     
    DevilsPGD, Jul 30, 2006
    #79
  20. Susan

    Ivor Jones Guest

    To steal bandwidth..? Hmm, ok.
    Well good for you, but don't assume that everyone else worldwide has those
    rights.

    By the way, who do you think is paying for all this..? Ask your customers
    if they're happy to fund your off-duty activities.


    Ivor
     
    Ivor Jones, Jul 30, 2006
    #80
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