Re: THE REAL GENERAL CLARK REVELAED

Discussion in 'Digital Photography' started by Jane Fondle, Sep 28, 2003.

  1. Jane Fondle

    Jane Fondle Guest

    (TonyaK911) wrote in message news:<>...
    > Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, who later commanded the barbaric NATO
    > air war in Kosovo, was the director of strategic plans and policy for
    > the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon during the genocidal
    > outbreak of killings in Rwanda and and Burundi. He and his boss Bill
    > Clint0n are among those who bear direct responsibility for allowing
    > this horror (which cost almost 1,000,000 human lives!) to happen.
    >
    > So, who is this General?...
    >
    > A VAIN, POMPOUS, BROWN-NOSER: MEET THE REAL GENERAL CLARK
    >
    > Anyone seeking to understand the bloody fiasco of the Serbian war need
    > hardly look further than the person of the beribboned Supreme Allied
    > Commander, General Wesley K. Clark. Politicians and journalists are
    > generally according him a respectful hearing as he discourses on the
    > "schedule" for the destruction of Serbia, tellingly embracing phrases
    > favored by military bureaucrats such as "systematic" and "methodical".
    >
    > The reaction from former army subordinates is very different.
    > "The poster child for everything that is wrong with the GO (general
    > officer) corps," exclaims one colonel, who has had occasion to observe
    > Clark in action, citing, among other examples, his command of the 1st
    > Cavalry Division at Fort Hood from 1992 to 1994.
    >
    > While Clark's official Pentagon biography proclaims his triumph in
    > "transitioning the Division into a rapidly deployable force" this
    > officer describes the "1st Horse Division" as "easily the worst
    > division I have ever seen in 25 years of doing this stuff."
    >
    > Such strong reactions are common. A major in the 3rd Brigade of the
    > 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado when Clark was in
    > command there in the early 1980s described him as a man who "regards
    > each and every one of his subordinates as a potential threat to his
    > career".
    >
    > While he regards his junior officers with watchful suspicion, he
    > customarily accords the lower ranks little more than arrogant
    > contempt. A veteran of Clark's tenure at Fort Hood recalls the
    > general's "massive tantrum because the privates and sergeants and
    > wives in the crowded (canteen) checkout lines didn't jump out of the
    > way fast enough to let him through".
    >
    > Clark's demeanor to those above is, of course, very different, a mode
    > of behavior that has earned him rich dividends over the years. Thus,
    > early in 1994, he was a candidate for promotion from two to three star
    > general. Only one hurdle remained - a war game exercise known as the
    > Battle Command Training Program in which Clark would have to maneuver
    > his division against an opposing force. The commander of the opposing
    > force, or "OPFOR" was known for the military skill with which he
    > routinely demolished opponents.
    >
    > But Clark's patrons on high were determined that no such humiliation
    > should be visited on their favorite. Prior to the exercise therefore,
    > strict orders came down that the battle should go Clark's way.
    > Accordingly, the OPFOR was reduced in strength by half, thus enabling
    > Clark, despite deploying tactics of signal ineptitude, to triumph. His
    > third star came down a few weeks later.
    >
    > Battle exercises and war games are of course meant to test the
    > fighting skills of commanders and troops. The army's most important
    > venue for such training is the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
    > California, where Clark commanded from October 1989 to October 1991
    > and where his men derisively nicknamed him "Section Leader Six" for
    > his obsessive micro-management.
    >
    > At the NTC, army units face a resident OPFOR that has, through
    > constant battle practice coupled with innovative tactics and close
    > knowledge of the terrain, become adept at routing the visiting "Blue
    > Force" opponents. For Clark, this naturally posed a problem. Not only
    > were his men using unconventional tactics, they were also humiliating
    > Blue Force generals who might nurture resentment against the NTC
    > commander and thus discommode his career at some future date. To the
    > disgust of the junior OPFOR officers Clark therefore frequently fought
    > to lose, sending his men on suicidal attacks in order that the Blue
    > Forces should go home happy and owing debts of gratitude to their
    > obliging foe.
    >
    > All observers agree that Clark has always displayed an obsessive
    > concern with the perquisites and appurtenances of rank. Ever since he
    > acceded to the Nato command post, the entourage with which he travels
    > has accordingly grown to gargantuan proportions to the point where
    > even civilians are beginning to comment. A Senate aide recalls his
    > appearances to testify, prior to which aides scurry about the room
    > adjusting lights, polishing his chair, testing the microphone etc
    > prior to the precisely timed and choreographed moment when the Supreme
    > Allied Commander Europe makes his entrance.
    >
    > "We are state of the art pomposity and arrogance up here," remarks the
    > aide. "So when a witness displays those traits so egregiously that
    > even the senators notice, you know we're in trouble." His NATO
    > subordinates call him, not with affection, "the Supreme Being".
    >
    > "Clark is smart," concludes one who has monitored his career. "But his
    > whole life has been spent manipulating appearances (e.g. the doctored
    > OPFOR exercise) in the interests of his career. Now he is faced with a
    > reality he can't control." This observer concludes that, confronted
    > with the wily Slobodan and other unavoidable variables of war, Clark
    > will soon come unglued. "Watch the carpets at NATO HQ for teeth
    > marks."
    >
    > http://www.counterpunch.org/clark.html
    >
    > ____________________________________________________________
    > WESLEY CLARK ALMOST TRIGGERS WORLD WAR 3
    > The Guardian
    >
    > Robertson's plum job in a warring Nato
    >
    > As Blair's man is installed, Richard Norton-Taylor details the way the
    > alliance generals have been fighting
    >
    > Tuesday August 3, 1999
    >
    > No sooner are we told by Britain's top generals that the Russians
    > played a crucial role in ending the west's war against Yugoslavia than
    > we learn that if Nato's supreme commander, the American General Wesley
    > Clark, had had his way, British paratroopers would have stormed
    > Pristina airport threatening to unleash the most frightening crisis
    > with Moscow since the end of the cold war.
    >
    > "I'm not going to start the third world war for you," General Sir Mike
    > Jackson, commander of the international K-For peacekeeping force, is
    > reported to have told Gen Clark when he refused to accept an order to
    > send assault troops to prevent Russian troops from taking over the
    > airfield of Kosovo's provincial capital.
    >
    > Hyperbole, perhaps. But, by all accounts, Jackson was deadly serious.
    > Clark, as he himself observed, was frustrated after fighting a war
    > with his hands tied behind his back, and was apparently willing to
    > risk everything for the sake of amour-propre .
    >
    > Nato's increasingly embarrassing, not to say ineffective, air assault
    > on Yugoslavia, had ended. It was over, not least as General Sir
    > Charles Guthrie, chief of the defence staff, acknowledged in an
    > interview with the Guardian, thanks to the intervention of Moscow -
    > its refusal to come to the aid of Belgrade. The point was emphatically
    > underlined by Jackson in a further interview over the weekend with the
    > Sunday Telegraph.
    >
    > "The event of June 3 [when Moscow urged Milosevic to surrender] was
    > the single event that appeared to me to have the greatest significance
    > in ending the war," said Jackson. Asked about the bombing campaign, he
    > added pointedly: "I wasn't responsible for the air campaign, you're
    > talking to the wrong person."
    >
    > Having helped Nato out of its predicament, Moscow was embroiled in
    > arguments with Washington about the status of Russian troops in the
    > K-For operation. For reasons to do with efficiency as much as power
    > politics, the west insisted the Russian contingent must be "Nato-led".
    > With or without Yeltsin's say-so, on June 12 a group of some 200
    > Russian troops drove out of Bosnia - where they were serving with the
    > Nato-led S-For stabilisation force - and in full view of the world's
    > television cameras made for Pristina airport where Jackson had planned
    > to set up his K-For headquarters guarded by British paratroopers.
    >
    > The Russians had made a political point, not a military one. It was
    > apparently too much for Clark. According to the US magazine, Newsweek,
    > General Clark ordered an airborne assault on the airfield by British
    > and French paratroopers. General Jackson refused. Clark then asked
    > Admiral James Ellis, the American commander of Nato's southern
    > command, to order helicopters to occupy the airport to prevent Russian
    > Ilyushin troop carriers from sending in reinforcements. Ellis replied
    > that the British General Jackson would oppose such a move. In the end
    > the Ilyushins were stopped when Washington persuaded Hungary, a new
    > Nato member, to refuse to allow the Russian aircraft to fly over its
    > territory.
    >
    > Jackson got full support from the British government for his refusal
    > to carry out the American general's orders. When Clark appealed to
    > Washington, he was allegedly given the brush-off. The American is said
    > to have complained to Jackson about the British general's refusal to
    > accept the order to take over Pristina airfield, and Jackson's
    > subsequent appeal to his political masters when Clark visited Kosovo
    > on June 24.
    >
    > The unsuccessful issuing of Clark's order has left a bitter taste,
    > especially given the delay in US marines joining the K-For operation -
    > a delay which Jackson had been prepared to indulge even though it held
    > up the entry into Kosovo. Had the British general carried out Clark's
    > instruction, all hope for a compromise with the Russians would have
    > been shattered. In the end, Nato and Moscow reached a compromise and
    > General Jackson willingly provided water and other supplies to
    > stranded Russian paratroopers holed up at the airfield. He swallowed
    > any hurt pride he might have had by insisting, not entirely
    > convincingly, that control of the airfield was not important.
    >
    > The episode triggers reminiscences of the Korean war. Then, General
    > Douglas MacArthur, commander of the UN force, wanted to invade, even
    > nuke, China, until he was brought to heel by President Truman. So
    > concerned was Clement Attlee that he urgently flew to Washington to
    > put an end to such madness. MacArthur was relieved of his command.
    >
    > The comparison, of course, is not exact, but worth recording
    > nonetheless. Last week, Clark was told in a telephone conversation
    > from General Henry Shelton, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff,
    > that he must leave his post early and make way for an older man,
    > General Joseph Ralston, a favourite of the American defence secretary,
    > William Cohen. Clark fell victim, not only to the Pristina airfield
    > row, but to his tense relationship with Washington throughout the war
    > - his repeated requests for more aircraft, including Apache
    > helicopters (never used in conflict because of the risk to pilots),
    > the need for a ground force contingency plan and an altogether more
    > effective strategy against Milosevic, a man he got to know well during
    > the 1995 Dayton peace negotiations on Bosnia. Asked to comment on
    > Clark's forced retirement, Jackson replied: "He is my superior officer
    > and that's it."
    >
    > So Nato will have a new supreme military commander close to Cohen and
    > a new secretary-general - George Robertson - equally close to the US
    > defence secretary as documents released under the US freedom of
    > information act and reported today elsewhere in this newspaper
    > testify. Though Nato was looking for a German - the defence minister,
    > Rudolf Scharping declined - Robertson is said to have the enthusiastic
    > support of the French and German governments to succeed the Spaniard,
    > Javier Solana, who will take up a new post responsible for developing
    > the EU's incipient common foreign and security policy.
    >
    > What does Robertson's appointment - expected to be formally approved
    > tomorrow - signify ? He is regarded as having a "safe" pair of hands.
    > He is unlikely to take risks. His main task will be to straddle the
    > Atlantic, to help patch fissures in the alliance which almost cracked
    > during the Kosovo war, and to persuade the Europeans to cooperate more
    > effectively in the defence and security field.
    >
    > Robertson has talked much of "defence diplomacy". He will need to put
    > this into practice, no more so than in Nato's relations with Russia,
    > as the transatlantic alliance looks towards the east. The superficial
    > rhetoric, Anglo-American arrogance, and the dangerously presumptuous
    > approach towards Moscow, must be laid to rest.
    >
    > http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,208123,00.html
    > _______________________________________________________
    > CLARK DODGES MOST OF SERVICE IN VIETNAM WAR
    >
    > David H. Hackworth
    > DEFENDING AMERICA
    > April 20, 1999
    > CLARK AND VIETNAM.
    >
    > NATO's Wesley Clark is not the Iron Duke, nor is he Stormin' Norman.
    > Unlike Wellington and Schwarzkopf, Clark's not a muddy boots soldier.
    > He's a military politician, without the right stuff to produce victory
    > over Serbia.
    >
    > Known by those who've served with him as the "Ultimate Perfumed
    > Prince," he's far more comfortable in a drawing room discussing
    > political theories than hunkering down in the trenches where bullets
    > fly and soldiers die. An intellectual in warrior's gear. A saying
    > attributed to General George Patton was that it took 10 years with
    > troops alone before an officer knew how to empty a bucket of spit As a
    > serving soldier with 33 years of active duty under his pistol belt,
    > Clark's commanded combat units -- rifle platoon to tank division - for
    > only seven years. The rest of his career's been spent as an aide, an
    > executive, a student and teacher and a staff weenie.
    >
    > Very much like generals Maxwell Taylor and William Westmoreland, the
    > architect and carpenter of the Vietnam disaster, Clark was earmarked
    > and then groomed early in his career for big things. At West Point he
    > graduated No. 1 in his class, and even though the Vietnam War was
    > raging and chewing up lieutenants faster than a machine gun can spit
    > death, he was seconded to Oxford for two years of contemplating
    > instead of to the trenches to lead a platoon.
    >
    > A year after graduating Oxford, he was sent to Vietnam, where, as a
    > combat leader for several months, he was bloodied and muddied. Unlike
    > most of his classmates, who did multiple combat tours in the killing
    > fields of Southeast Asia, he spent the rest of the war sheltered in
    > the ivy towers of West Point or learning power games first hand as a
    > White House fellow.
    >
    > The war with Serbia has been going full tilt for almost a month and
    > Clark's NATO is like a giant standing on a concrete pad wielding a
    > sledgehammer crushing Serbian ants. Yet, with all its awesome might,
    > NATO hasn't won a round. Instead, Milosovic is still calling all the
    > shots from his Belgrade bunker, and all that's left for Clark is to
    > react. Milosevic plays the fiddle and Clark dances the jig. 'Stormin'
    > Norman or any good infantry sergeant major would have told Clark that
    > conventional air power alone could never win a war -- it must be
    > accompanied by boots on the ground.
    >
    > German air power didn't beat Britain. Allied air power didn't beat
    > Germany. More air power than was used against the Japanese and Germans
    > combined didn't win in Vietnam. Forty three days of pummeling in the
    > open desert where there was no place to hide didn't KO Saddam. That
    > fight ended only when Schwarzkopf unleashed the steel ground fist he'd
    > carefully positioned before the first bomb fell.
    >
    > Doing military things exactly backwards, the scholar general is now,
    > according to a high ranking Pentagon source, in "total panic mode" as
    > he tries to mass the air and ground forces he finally figured out he
    > needs to win the initiative. Mass is a principle of war. Clark has
    > violated this rule along with the other eight vital principles. Any
    > mud soldier will tell you if you don't follow the principles of war
    > you lose.
    >
    > One of the salient reasons Wellington whipped Napoleon in 1815 at
    > Waterloo is that the Corsican piecemealed his forces. Clark's done the
    > same thing with his air power. He started with leisurely pinpricks and
    > now is attempting to increase the pain against an opponent with an
    > almost unlimited threshold. Similar gradualism was one of the reasons
    > for defeat in Vietnam.
    >
    > Another mistake Clark's made is not knowing his enemy. Taylor and
    > Westmoreland made this same error in Vietnam. Like the Vietnamese, the
    > Serbs are fanatic warriors who know better than to fight
    > conventionally in open formations. They'll use the rugged terrain and
    > bomber bad weather to conduct the guerrilla operations they've been
    > preparing for over 50 years.
    >
    > And they're damn good at partisan warfare. Just ask any German 70
    > years or older if a fight in Serbia will be another Desert Storm. It's
    > the smart general who knows when to retreat. If Clark lets pride stand
    > in the way of military judgment, expect a long and bloody war.


    He is a strange guy for a 4 star General!
     
    Jane Fondle, Sep 28, 2003
    #1
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  2. Jane Fondle

    Frankhartx Guest

    >rom: (Jane Fondle)

    Do your revealing in the right place NOT^ HERE
     
    Frankhartx, Sep 28, 2003
    #2
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  3. (Jane Fondle) wrote in
    news::

    > He is a strange guy for a 4 star General!
    >


    And you are strange girl that thinks r.p.d is an
    appropriate place for telling us so.


    Roland
     
    Roland Karlsson, Sep 28, 2003
    #3
  4. Jane Fondle

    TonyaK911 Guest

    How the hell did photo equipment get here???
    I'm asking whoever started this cross-posting to
    rec.photo.equipment.35mm, rec.photo.digital, etc. to stop this
    practice.
    Thank you in advance.
    TK9

    (Jane Fondle) wrote in message news:<>...
    > (TonyaK911) wrote in message news:<>...
    > > Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, who later commanded the barbaric NATO
    > > air war in Kosovo, was the director of strategic plans and policy for
    > > the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon during the genocidal
    > > outbreak of killings in Rwanda and and Burundi. He and his boss Bill
    > > Clint0n are among those who bear direct responsibility for allowing
    > > this horror (which cost almost 1,000,000 human lives!) to happen.
    > >
    > > So, who is this General?...
    > >
    > > A VAIN, POMPOUS, BROWN-NOSER: MEET THE REAL GENERAL CLARK
    > >
    > > Anyone seeking to understand the bloody fiasco of the Serbian war need
    > > hardly look further than the person of the beribboned Supreme Allied
    > > Commander, General Wesley K. Clark. Politicians and journalists are
    > > generally according him a respectful hearing as he discourses on the
    > > "schedule" for the destruction of Serbia, tellingly embracing phrases
    > > favored by military bureaucrats such as "systematic" and "methodical".
    > >
    > > The reaction from former army subordinates is very different.
    > > "The poster child for everything that is wrong with the GO (general
    > > officer) corps," exclaims one colonel, who has had occasion to observe
    > > Clark in action, citing, among other examples, his command of the 1st
    > > Cavalry Division at Fort Hood from 1992 to 1994.
    > >
    > > While Clark's official Pentagon biography proclaims his triumph in
    > > "transitioning the Division into a rapidly deployable force" this
    > > officer describes the "1st Horse Division" as "easily the worst
    > > division I have ever seen in 25 years of doing this stuff."
    > >
    > > Such strong reactions are common. A major in the 3rd Brigade of the
    > > 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado when Clark was in
    > > command there in the early 1980s described him as a man who "regards
    > > each and every one of his subordinates as a potential threat to his
    > > career".
    > >
    > > While he regards his junior officers with watchful suspicion, he
    > > customarily accords the lower ranks little more than arrogant
    > > contempt. A veteran of Clark's tenure at Fort Hood recalls the
    > > general's "massive tantrum because the privates and sergeants and
    > > wives in the crowded (canteen) checkout lines didn't jump out of the
    > > way fast enough to let him through".
    > >
    > > Clark's demeanor to those above is, of course, very different, a mode
    > > of behavior that has earned him rich dividends over the years. Thus,
    > > early in 1994, he was a candidate for promotion from two to three star
    > > general. Only one hurdle remained - a war game exercise known as the
    > > Battle Command Training Program in which Clark would have to maneuver
    > > his division against an opposing force. The commander of the opposing
    > > force, or "OPFOR" was known for the military skill with which he
    > > routinely demolished opponents.
    > >
    > > But Clark's patrons on high were determined that no such humiliation
    > > should be visited on their favorite. Prior to the exercise therefore,
    > > strict orders came down that the battle should go Clark's way.
    > > Accordingly, the OPFOR was reduced in strength by half, thus enabling
    > > Clark, despite deploying tactics of signal ineptitude, to triumph. His
    > > third star came down a few weeks later.
    > >
    > > Battle exercises and war games are of course meant to test the
    > > fighting skills of commanders and troops. The army's most important
    > > venue for such training is the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
    > > California, where Clark commanded from October 1989 to October 1991
    > > and where his men derisively nicknamed him "Section Leader Six" for
    > > his obsessive micro-management.
    > >
    > > At the NTC, army units face a resident OPFOR that has, through
    > > constant battle practice coupled with innovative tactics and close
    > > knowledge of the terrain, become adept at routing the visiting "Blue
    > > Force" opponents. For Clark, this naturally posed a problem. Not only
    > > were his men using unconventional tactics, they were also humiliating
    > > Blue Force generals who might nurture resentment against the NTC
    > > commander and thus discommode his career at some future date. To the
    > > disgust of the junior OPFOR officers Clark therefore frequently fought
    > > to lose, sending his men on suicidal attacks in order that the Blue
    > > Forces should go home happy and owing debts of gratitude to their
    > > obliging foe.
    > >
    > > All observers agree that Clark has always displayed an obsessive
    > > concern with the perquisites and appurtenances of rank. Ever since he
    > > acceded to the Nato command post, the entourage with which he travels
    > > has accordingly grown to gargantuan proportions to the point where
    > > even civilians are beginning to comment. A Senate aide recalls his
    > > appearances to testify, prior to which aides scurry about the room
    > > adjusting lights, polishing his chair, testing the microphone etc
    > > prior to the precisely timed and choreographed moment when the Supreme
    > > Allied Commander Europe makes his entrance.
    > >
    > > "We are state of the art pomposity and arrogance up here," remarks the
    > > aide. "So when a witness displays those traits so egregiously that
    > > even the senators notice, you know we're in trouble." His NATO
    > > subordinates call him, not with affection, "the Supreme Being".
    > >
    > > "Clark is smart," concludes one who has monitored his career. "But his
    > > whole life has been spent manipulating appearances (e.g. the doctored
    > > OPFOR exercise) in the interests of his career. Now he is faced with a
    > > reality he can't control." This observer concludes that, confronted
    > > with the wily Slobodan and other unavoidable variables of war, Clark
    > > will soon come unglued. "Watch the carpets at NATO HQ for teeth
    > > marks."
    > >
    > > http://www.counterpunch.org/clark.html
    > >
    > > ____________________________________________________________
    > > WESLEY CLARK ALMOST TRIGGERS WORLD WAR 3
    > > The Guardian
    > >
    > > Robertson's plum job in a warring Nato
    > >
    > > As Blair's man is installed, Richard Norton-Taylor details the way the
    > > alliance generals have been fighting
    > >
    > > Tuesday August 3, 1999
    > >
    > > No sooner are we told by Britain's top generals that the Russians
    > > played a crucial role in ending the west's war against Yugoslavia than
    > > we learn that if Nato's supreme commander, the American General Wesley
    > > Clark, had had his way, British paratroopers would have stormed
    > > Pristina airport threatening to unleash the most frightening crisis
    > > with Moscow since the end of the cold war.
    > >
    > > "I'm not going to start the third world war for you," General Sir Mike
    > > Jackson, commander of the international K-For peacekeeping force, is
    > > reported to have told Gen Clark when he refused to accept an order to
    > > send assault troops to prevent Russian troops from taking over the
    > > airfield of Kosovo's provincial capital.
    > >
    > > Hyperbole, perhaps. But, by all accounts, Jackson was deadly serious.
    > > Clark, as he himself observed, was frustrated after fighting a war
    > > with his hands tied behind his back, and was apparently willing to
    > > risk everything for the sake of amour-propre .
    > >
    > > Nato's increasingly embarrassing, not to say ineffective, air assault
    > > on Yugoslavia, had ended. It was over, not least as General Sir
    > > Charles Guthrie, chief of the defence staff, acknowledged in an
    > > interview with the Guardian, thanks to the intervention of Moscow -
    > > its refusal to come to the aid of Belgrade. The point was emphatically
    > > underlined by Jackson in a further interview over the weekend with the
    > > Sunday Telegraph.
    > >
    > > "The event of June 3 [when Moscow urged Milosevic to surrender] was
    > > the single event that appeared to me to have the greatest significance
    > > in ending the war," said Jackson. Asked about the bombing campaign, he
    > > added pointedly: "I wasn't responsible for the air campaign, you're
    > > talking to the wrong person."
    > >
    > > Having helped Nato out of its predicament, Moscow was embroiled in
    > > arguments with Washington about the status of Russian troops in the
    > > K-For operation. For reasons to do with efficiency as much as power
    > > politics, the west insisted the Russian contingent must be "Nato-led".
    > > With or without Yeltsin's say-so, on June 12 a group of some 200
    > > Russian troops drove out of Bosnia - where they were serving with the
    > > Nato-led S-For stabilisation force - and in full view of the world's
    > > television cameras made for Pristina airport where Jackson had planned
    > > to set up his K-For headquarters guarded by British paratroopers.
    > >
    > > The Russians had made a political point, not a military one. It was
    > > apparently too much for Clark. According to the US magazine, Newsweek,
    > > General Clark ordered an airborne assault on the airfield by British
    > > and French paratroopers. General Jackson refused. Clark then asked
    > > Admiral James Ellis, the American commander of Nato's southern
    > > command, to order helicopters to occupy the airport to prevent Russian
    > > Ilyushin troop carriers from sending in reinforcements. Ellis replied
    > > that the British General Jackson would oppose such a move. In the end
    > > the Ilyushins were stopped when Washington persuaded Hungary, a new
    > > Nato member, to refuse to allow the Russian aircraft to fly over its
    > > territory.
    > >
    > > Jackson got full support from the British government for his refusal
    > > to carry out the American general's orders. When Clark appealed to
    > > Washington, he was allegedly given the brush-off. The American is said
    > > to have complained to Jackson about the British general's refusal to
    > > accept the order to take over Pristina airfield, and Jackson's
    > > subsequent appeal to his political masters when Clark visited Kosovo
    > > on June 24.
    > >
    > > The unsuccessful issuing of Clark's order has left a bitter taste,
    > > especially given the delay in US marines joining the K-For operation -
    > > a delay which Jackson had been prepared to indulge even though it held
    > > up the entry into Kosovo. Had the British general carried out Clark's
    > > instruction, all hope for a compromise with the Russians would have
    > > been shattered. In the end, Nato and Moscow reached a compromise and
    > > General Jackson willingly provided water and other supplies to
    > > stranded Russian paratroopers holed up at the airfield. He swallowed
    > > any hurt pride he might have had by insisting, not entirely
    > > convincingly, that control of the airfield was not important.
    > >
    > > The episode triggers reminiscences of the Korean war. Then, General
    > > Douglas MacArthur, commander of the UN force, wanted to invade, even
    > > nuke, China, until he was brought to heel by President Truman. So
    > > concerned was Clement Attlee that he urgently flew to Washington to
    > > put an end to such madness. MacArthur was relieved of his command.
    > >
    > > The comparison, of course, is not exact, but worth recording
    > > nonetheless. Last week, Clark was told in a telephone conversation
    > > from General Henry Shelton, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff,
    > > that he must leave his post early and make way for an older man,
    > > General Joseph Ralston, a favourite of the American defence secretary,
    > > William Cohen. Clark fell victim, not only to the Pristina airfield
    > > row, but to his tense relationship with Washington throughout the war
    > > - his repeated requests for more aircraft, including Apache
    > > helicopters (never used in conflict because of the risk to pilots),
    > > the need for a ground force contingency plan and an altogether more
    > > effective strategy against Milosevic, a man he got to know well during
    > > the 1995 Dayton peace negotiations on Bosnia. Asked to comment on
    > > Clark's forced retirement, Jackson replied: "He is my superior officer
    > > and that's it."
    > >
    > > So Nato will have a new supreme military commander close to Cohen and
    > > a new secretary-general - George Robertson - equally close to the US
    > > defence secretary as documents released under the US freedom of
    > > information act and reported today elsewhere in this newspaper
    > > testify. Though Nato was looking for a German - the defence minister,
    > > Rudolf Scharping declined - Robertson is said to have the enthusiastic
    > > support of the French and German governments to succeed the Spaniard,
    > > Javier Solana, who will take up a new post responsible for developing
    > > the EU's incipient common foreign and security policy.
    > >
    > > What does Robertson's appointment - expected to be formally approved
    > > tomorrow - signify ? He is regarded as having a "safe" pair of hands.
    > > He is unlikely to take risks. His main task will be to straddle the
    > > Atlantic, to help patch fissures in the alliance which almost cracked
    > > during the Kosovo war, and to persuade the Europeans to cooperate more
    > > effectively in the defence and security field.
    > >
    > > Robertson has talked much of "defence diplomacy". He will need to put
    > > this into practice, no more so than in Nato's relations with Russia,
    > > as the transatlantic alliance looks towards the east. The superficial
    > > rhetoric, Anglo-American arrogance, and the dangerously presumptuous
    > > approach towards Moscow, must be laid to rest.
    > >
    > > http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,208123,00.html
    > > _______________________________________________________
    > > CLARK DODGES MOST OF SERVICE IN VIETNAM WAR
    > >
    > > David H. Hackworth
    > > DEFENDING AMERICA
    > > April 20, 1999
    > > CLARK AND VIETNAM.
    > >
    > > NATO's Wesley Clark is not the Iron Duke, nor is he Stormin' Norman.
    > > Unlike Wellington and Schwarzkopf, Clark's not a muddy boots soldier.
    > > He's a military politician, without the right stuff to produce victory
    > > over Serbia.
    > >
    > > Known by those who've served with him as the "Ultimate Perfumed
    > > Prince," he's far more comfortable in a drawing room discussing
    > > political theories than hunkering down in the trenches where bullets
    > > fly and soldiers die. An intellectual in warrior's gear. A saying
    > > attributed to General George Patton was that it took 10 years with
    > > troops alone before an officer knew how to empty a bucket of spit As a
    > > serving soldier with 33 years of active duty under his pistol belt,
    > > Clark's commanded combat units -- rifle platoon to tank division - for
    > > only seven years. The rest of his career's been spent as an aide, an
    > > executive, a student and teacher and a staff weenie.
    > >
    > > Very much like generals Maxwell Taylor and William Westmoreland, the
    > > architect and carpenter of the Vietnam disaster, Clark was earmarked
    > > and then groomed early in his career for big things. At West Point he
    > > graduated No. 1 in his class, and even though the Vietnam War was
    > > raging and chewing up lieutenants faster than a machine gun can spit
    > > death, he was seconded to Oxford for two years of contemplating
    > > instead of to the trenches to lead a platoon.
    > >
    > > A year after graduating Oxford, he was sent to Vietnam, where, as a
    > > combat leader for several months, he was bloodied and muddied. Unlike
    > > most of his classmates, who did multiple combat tours in the killing
    > > fields of Southeast Asia, he spent the rest of the war sheltered in
    > > the ivy towers of West Point or learning power games first hand as a
    > > White House fellow.
    > >
    > > The war with Serbia has been going full tilt for almost a month and
    > > Clark's NATO is like a giant standing on a concrete pad wielding a
    > > sledgehammer crushing Serbian ants. Yet, with all its awesome might,
    > > NATO hasn't won a round. Instead, Milosovic is still calling all the
    > > shots from his Belgrade bunker, and all that's left for Clark is to
    > > react. Milosevic plays the fiddle and Clark dances the jig. 'Stormin'
    > > Norman or any good infantry sergeant major would have told Clark that
    > > conventional air power alone could never win a war -- it must be
    > > accompanied by boots on the ground.
    > >
    > > German air power didn't beat Britain. Allied air power didn't beat
    > > Germany. More air power than was used against the Japanese and Germans
    > > combined didn't win in Vietnam. Forty three days of pummeling in the
    > > open desert where there was no place to hide didn't KO Saddam. That
    > > fight ended only when Schwarzkopf unleashed the steel ground fist he'd
    > > carefully positioned before the first bomb fell.
    > >
    > > Doing military things exactly backwards, the scholar general is now,
    > > according to a high ranking Pentagon source, in "total panic mode" as
    > > he tries to mass the air and ground forces he finally figured out he
    > > needs to win the initiative. Mass is a principle of war. Clark has
    > > violated this rule along with the other eight vital principles. Any
    > > mud soldier will tell you if you don't follow the principles of war
    > > you lose.
    > >
    > > One of the salient reasons Wellington whipped Napoleon in 1815 at
    > > Waterloo is that the Corsican piecemealed his forces. Clark's done the
    > > same thing with his air power. He started with leisurely pinpricks and
    > > now is attempting to increase the pain against an opponent with an
    > > almost unlimited threshold. Similar gradualism was one of the reasons
    > > for defeat in Vietnam.
    > >
    > > Another mistake Clark's made is not knowing his enemy. Taylor and
    > > Westmoreland made this same error in Vietnam. Like the Vietnamese, the
    > > Serbs are fanatic warriors who know better than to fight
    > > conventionally in open formations. They'll use the rugged terrain and
    > > bomber bad weather to conduct the guerrilla operations they've been
    > > preparing for over 50 years.
    > >
    > > And they're damn good at partisan warfare. Just ask any German 70
    > > years or older if a fight in Serbia will be another Desert Storm. It's
    > > the smart general who knows when to retreat. If Clark lets pride stand
    > > in the way of military judgment, expect a long and bloody war.

    >
    > He is a strange guy for a 4 star General!
     
    TonyaK911, Sep 29, 2003
    #4
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