Option to take over edge devices formerly managed by WAN vendor

Discussion in 'Cisco' started by Ned Hart, May 11, 2004.

  1. Ned Hart

    Ned Hart Guest

    Our WAN vendor owns and manages our edge switches and has given us the
    option to install and manage our own edge switches while they continue
    to provide ATM service and equipment between 8 buildings. The edge
    switches form the backbone of the LAN in each building and I would
    really like to be able to manage and monitor these devices, which the
    vendor does not currently allow me to do. My network consists of 1,000
    nodes and about 15 vlans. I have configured cisco switches, firewalls
    and routers in smaller environments, but never anything that connects
    to an ATM WAN so I'm a little hesitant to make a decision. I imagine
    it's going to be the same, except on a larger scale. My feeling as
    that being able to manage these switches will allow me to install an
    IDS, perhaps control traffic based on the application generating it,
    and do many other things that I cannot do now because of the lack of
    access. I would appreciate hearing the opinions of others as to
    whether this would be a good move or not and just how big a task it
    might be.


    Thanks
    NH














    My WAN service provider owns and manages our edge switches and
    recently gave me the option to purchase and manage my own edge
    equipment. They will still provide ATM service and equipment between
    our 5 buildings, but I will own and manage the switches that connect
    our LAN's to the ATM WAN.

    We have a total of 1,000 nodes with fiber branching out from MDFs in
    each


    The current vendor owned switches are Marconi ES3810's and they form
    the backbone of LAN in each building. The vendor gives us zero access
    to these switches and I have no way to monitor traffic, install an IDS
    or


















    Okay, I've got a big decision to make and I need some advice.
    I'm in charge of a network consisting of 8 buildings and 1000 nodes
    connected by an ATM WAN. For the past 4 years our WAN vendor has also
    provided and managed our edge devices which are Marconi ES3810
    workgroup switches. We are renewing our service contract for the WAN
    and we have the option to purchase and manage our own edge devices,
    the vendor would continue to provide and manage the ATM WAN.

    I've configured firewalls, switches, routers, vlans, dhcp helper, and
    done many other things over the past 10 years, but I mostly do network
    administration.
     
    Ned Hart, May 11, 2004
    #1
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  2. In article <>,
    Ned Hart <> wrote 3 different versions of...
    :Our WAN vendor owns and manages our edge switches and has given us the
    :eek:ption to install and manage our own edge switches while they continue
    :to provide ATM service and equipment between 8 buildings.

    :I have configured cisco switches, firewalls
    :and routers in smaller environments, but never anything that connects
    :to an ATM WAN so I'm a little hesitant to make a decision. I imagine
    :it's going to be the same, except on a larger scale.

    The vendor will, I'm sure, tell you exactly what PVC numbers to use,
    and will be responsible for keeping the ATM up and monitored, so you
    probably will barely notice the ATM aspects once it is configured the
    first time. The ATM-specific configuration required is not long; once
    it is in place, it just becomes a matter of setting up routing on a
    subinterface (or bridging of the appropriate vlan). I would, though,
    ask who will be responsible for the routing decisions: if what you get
    out of it is effectively just an internet link with the WAN vendor
    handling the routing, then it is pretty easy to deal with. If, though,
    you have to start getting into BGP or other such gateway routing
    protocols (which you might have to do if you have multiple WAN
    connections) then it does get trickier than routine LAN work. You said
    "switches", not "routers", so you -probably- won't have to deal with
    that layer.


    :My feeling as
    :that being able to manage these switches will allow me to install an
    :IDS, perhaps control traffic based on the application generating it,
    :and do many other things that I cannot do now because of the lack of
    :access.

    If you don't have an IDS now, then do you have a firewall? I would
    rate a firewall as a higher priority than an IDS. Unfortunately,
    current versions of the PIX firewall series do not support QoS
    (rumoured to be supported in the forthcoming 7.0), unless you get into
    the very expensive FWSM (Firewall Services Module) for the 6500 series.


    The problem with IDS's is that in order for them to be useful, someone
    has to actually read the logs and act on the results promptly. And
    these days, there are a *lot* of low-level attacks going on. We're not
    very big (2 x /24), and we aren't an "attractive nuisance" (e.g., we're
    not Microsoft or the whitehouse or grc.com), but these days we're
    running about 1.2 Gb of firewall logs a week. [The day 'blaster'
    started, we ran very close to 1 Gb on that day alone.] The bulk of the
    traffic is automated scans, often from remotely controlled proxies --
    what I call "hit and run traffic". What are you going to *do* about it?

    You can't really read more than a few thousand lines of IDS or
    firewall logs without your mind going numb -- and we're getting
    above 3/4 *million* lines of firewall logs per day. You simply cannot
    process that kind of volume without some hefty filtering algorithms
    that take a long time to develop... and which have to keep changing
    because the attack patterns keep evolving. Sure you can get tools
    [e.g., from Network Intelligence] that will tell you things like
    the top 25 attackers -- but those top 25 attackers are probably long
    gone by the time you generate the report. You're probably more
    interested in the site that's been probing 4 more of your machines a day
    each day for the last several days, hoping that you don't notice
    the scans down amongst all the other noise...

    IDS's are thus, in a sense, quite expensive: you have to put a lot
    of effort into making sense of what the logs are telling you. Don't just
    think you can put up snort or an IDS sensor and expect nice short
    little actionable reports once every couple of months: if you are
    exposed to the Internet, then someone/something is trying to break into your
    network every few -seconds-. [The last record I heard of, was that
    an unprotected NT-type system deliberately exposed to the 'net was
    infected a mere 1.6 seconds later!] You shouldn't, in my experience,
    be seriously considering an edge-level IDS unless you are prepared to
    spend a substantial amount of time analysing logs and developing
    log filtering & analysis programs.


    For completeness, I should mention that there are some commercial firms
    which will undertake IDS and firewall log analyses and alerting as
    a service. If your business has noticable assets to protect, then it
    might be worth going with one of those (in which case, it would probably
    be best to consult with them first as to what technical infrastructure
    they need in place.) The only such service that I can name at the
    moment is Counterpane, which Bruce Schneier (of Applied Cryptography
    fame) works for. There are probably others.

    --
    millihamlet: the average coherency of prose created by a single monkey
    typing randomly on a keyboard. Usenet postings may be rated in mHl.
    -- Walter Roberson
     
    Walter Roberson, May 11, 2004
    #2
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  3. Ned Hart

    Ned Hart Guest

    Hi Walter

    Thanks for your very detailed response.


    -cnrc.gc.ca (Walter Roberson) wrote in message news:<c7r2c5$6i2$>...
    > In article <>,
    > Ned Hart <> wrote 3 different versions of...
    > :Our WAN vendor owns and manages our edge switches and has given us the
    > :eek:ption to install and manage our own edge switches while they continue
    > :to provide ATM service and equipment between 8 buildings.
    >
    > :I have configured cisco switches, firewalls
    > :and routers in smaller environments, but never anything that connects
    > :to an ATM WAN so I'm a little hesitant to make a decision. I imagine
    > :it's going to be the same, except on a larger scale.
    >
    > The vendor will, I'm sure, tell you exactly what PVC numbers to use,
    > and will be responsible for keeping the ATM up and monitored, so you
    > probably will barely notice the ATM aspects once it is configured the
    > first time. The ATM-specific configuration required is not long; once
    > it is in place, it just becomes a matter of setting up routing on a
    > subinterface (or bridging of the appropriate vlan). I would, though,
    > ask who will be responsible for the routing decisions: if what you get
    > out of it is effectively just an internet link with the WAN vendor
    > handling the routing, then it is pretty easy to deal with. If, though,
    > you have to start getting into BGP or other such gateway routing
    > protocols (which you might have to do if you have multiple WAN
    > connections) then it does get trickier than routine LAN work. You said
    > "switches", not "routers", so you -probably- won't have to deal with
    > that layer.
    >
    >
    > :My feeling as
    > :that being able to manage these switches will allow me to install an
    > :IDS, perhaps control traffic based on the application generating it,
    > :and do many other things that I cannot do now because of the lack of
    > :access.
    >
    > If you don't have an IDS now, then do you have a firewall? I would
    > rate a firewall as a higher priority than an IDS. Unfortunately,
    > current versions of the PIX firewall series do not support QoS
    > (rumoured to be supported in the forthcoming 7.0), unless you get into
    > the very expensive FWSM (Firewall Services Module) for the 6500 series.
    >
    >
    > The problem with IDS's is that in order for them to be useful, someone
    > has to actually read the logs and act on the results promptly. And
    > these days, there are a *lot* of low-level attacks going on. We're not
    > very big (2 x /24), and we aren't an "attractive nuisance" (e.g., we're
    > not Microsoft or the whitehouse or grc.com), but these days we're
    > running about 1.2 Gb of firewall logs a week. [The day 'blaster'
    > started, we ran very close to 1 Gb on that day alone.] The bulk of the
    > traffic is automated scans, often from remotely controlled proxies --
    > what I call "hit and run traffic". What are you going to *do* about it?
    >
    > You can't really read more than a few thousand lines of IDS or
    > firewall logs without your mind going numb -- and we're getting
    > above 3/4 *million* lines of firewall logs per day. You simply cannot
    > process that kind of volume without some hefty filtering algorithms
    > that take a long time to develop... and which have to keep changing
    > because the attack patterns keep evolving. Sure you can get tools
    > [e.g., from Network Intelligence] that will tell you things like
    > the top 25 attackers -- but those top 25 attackers are probably long
    > gone by the time you generate the report. You're probably more
    > interested in the site that's been probing 4 more of your machines a day
    > each day for the last several days, hoping that you don't notice
    > the scans down amongst all the other noise...
    >
    > IDS's are thus, in a sense, quite expensive: you have to put a lot
    > of effort into making sense of what the logs are telling you. Don't just
    > think you can put up snort or an IDS sensor and expect nice short
    > little actionable reports once every couple of months: if you are
    > exposed to the Internet, then someone/something is trying to break into your
    > network every few -seconds-. [The last record I heard of, was that
    > an unprotected NT-type system deliberately exposed to the 'net was
    > infected a mere 1.6 seconds later!] You shouldn't, in my experience,
    > be seriously considering an edge-level IDS unless you are prepared to
    > spend a substantial amount of time analysing logs and developing
    > log filtering & analysis programs.
    >
    >
    > For completeness, I should mention that there are some commercial firms
    > which will undertake IDS and firewall log analyses and alerting as
    > a service. If your business has noticable assets to protect, then it
    > might be worth going with one of those (in which case, it would probably
    > be best to consult with them first as to what technical infrastructure
    > they need in place.) The only such service that I can name at the
    > moment is Counterpane, which Bruce Schneier (of Applied Cryptography
    > fame) works for. There are probably others.
     
    Ned Hart, May 13, 2004
    #3
  4. Ned Hart

    Ned Hart Guest

    Hi Walter

    I read your reply and realized I need more details from the vendor. I
    also realized that I don't know enough about the larger switches and
    ATM to select the right equipment for my organization, especially
    since we also want to move to Gigabit Ethernet over Cat 5. I am
    contacting the vendor to find out exactly what they will provide and
    exactly what will be expected of us. That should give me enough
    information to start looking at switches. I'm including a list of
    devices located at our main office. I'm not at the office now so I
    don't have details of the installed modules, but I'm hoping this will
    give some indication of what we will need to purchase as a
    replacement. If possible, I'd appreciate some advice on which cisco
    product I should start looking at.

    Here is a list of the devices installed at our main office:
    Fore ASN-9000
    http://boulder.noaa.gov/noc/fore/manuals/LANacces/s025501a.pdf
    ASX-200BX
    http://www.marconi.com/media/asx1200_ds.pdf
    Fore ES-3810
    http://boulder.noaa.gov/noc/fore/manuals/LANacces/s0145_03.pdf

    Thanks
    NH



    -cnrc.gc.ca (Walter Roberson) wrote in message news:<c7r2c5$6i2$>...
    > In article <>,
    > Ned Hart <> wrote 3 different versions of...
    > :Our WAN vendor owns and manages our edge switches and has given us the
    > :eek:ption to install and manage our own edge switches while they continue
    > :to provide ATM service and equipment between 8 buildings.
    >
    > :I have configured cisco switches, firewalls
    > :and routers in smaller environments, but never anything that connects
    > :to an ATM WAN so I'm a little hesitant to make a decision. I imagine
    > :it's going to be the same, except on a larger scale.
    >
    > The vendor will, I'm sure, tell you exactly what PVC numbers to use,
    > and will be responsible for keeping the ATM up and monitored, so you
    > probably will barely notice the ATM aspects once it is configured the
    > first time. The ATM-specific configuration required is not long; once
    > it is in place, it just becomes a matter of setting up routing on a
    > subinterface (or bridging of the appropriate vlan). I would, though,
    > ask who will be responsible for the routing decisions: if what you get
    > out of it is effectively just an internet link with the WAN vendor
    > handling the routing, then it is pretty easy to deal with. If, though,
    > you have to start getting into BGP or other such gateway routing
    > protocols (which you might have to do if you have multiple WAN
    > connections) then it does get trickier than routine LAN work. You said
    > "switches", not "routers", so you -probably- won't have to deal with
    > that layer.
    >
    >
    > :My feeling as
    > :that being able to manage these switches will allow me to install an
    > :IDS, perhaps control traffic based on the application generating it,
    > :and do many other things that I cannot do now because of the lack of
    > :access.
    >
    > If you don't have an IDS now, then do you have a firewall? I would
    > rate a firewall as a higher priority than an IDS. Unfortunately,
    > current versions of the PIX firewall series do not support QoS
    > (rumoured to be supported in the forthcoming 7.0), unless you get into
    > the very expensive FWSM (Firewall Services Module) for the 6500 series.
    >
    >
    > The problem with IDS's is that in order for them to be useful, someone
    > has to actually read the logs and act on the results promptly. And
    > these days, there are a *lot* of low-level attacks going on. We're not
    > very big (2 x /24), and we aren't an "attractive nuisance" (e.g., we're
    > not Microsoft or the whitehouse or grc.com), but these days we're
    > running about 1.2 Gb of firewall logs a week. [The day 'blaster'
    > started, we ran very close to 1 Gb on that day alone.] The bulk of the
    > traffic is automated scans, often from remotely controlled proxies --
    > what I call "hit and run traffic". What are you going to *do* about it?
    >
    > You can't really read more than a few thousand lines of IDS or
    > firewall logs without your mind going numb -- and we're getting
    > above 3/4 *million* lines of firewall logs per day. You simply cannot
    > process that kind of volume without some hefty filtering algorithms
    > that take a long time to develop... and which have to keep changing
    > because the attack patterns keep evolving. Sure you can get tools
    > [e.g., from Network Intelligence] that will tell you things like
    > the top 25 attackers -- but those top 25 attackers are probably long
    > gone by the time you generate the report. You're probably more
    > interested in the site that's been probing 4 more of your machines a day
    > each day for the last several days, hoping that you don't notice
    > the scans down amongst all the other noise...
    >
    > IDS's are thus, in a sense, quite expensive: you have to put a lot
    > of effort into making sense of what the logs are telling you. Don't just
    > think you can put up snort or an IDS sensor and expect nice short
    > little actionable reports once every couple of months: if you are
    > exposed to the Internet, then someone/something is trying to break into your
    > network every few -seconds-. [The last record I heard of, was that
    > an unprotected NT-type system deliberately exposed to the 'net was
    > infected a mere 1.6 seconds later!] You shouldn't, in my experience,
    > be seriously considering an edge-level IDS unless you are prepared to
    > spend a substantial amount of time analysing logs and developing
    > log filtering & analysis programs.
    >
    >
    > For completeness, I should mention that there are some commercial firms
    > which will undertake IDS and firewall log analyses and alerting as
    > a service. If your business has noticable assets to protect, then it
    > might be worth going with one of those (in which case, it would probably
    > be best to consult with them first as to what technical infrastructure
    > they need in place.) The only such service that I can name at the
    > moment is Counterpane, which Bruce Schneier (of Applied Cryptography
    > fame) works for. There are probably others.
     
    Ned Hart, May 13, 2004
    #4
  5. In article <>,
    Ned Hart <> wrote:
    :I read your reply and realized I need more details from the vendor. I
    :also realized that I don't know enough about the larger switches and
    :ATM to select the right equipment for my organization, especially
    :since we also want to move to Gigabit Ethernet over Cat 5. I am
    :contacting the vendor to find out exactly what they will provide and
    :exactly what will be expected of us. That should give me enough
    :information to start looking at switches.

    That's a good place to start -- with the requirements definition.

    If you need ATM at the switch level (i.e., your internal distribution
    is by ATM, not just your WAN links), then it appears you would want
    a Cisco 4500/4700, or 7000, or 7500. The Cat 5000 handled ATM, but
    it is EOL. There are also devices in the Lightstream line and the
    85xx MSR line.

    Depending how many ports you need, something around a 7206VXR might
    be right for you: it supports the PA-A1 ATM Port Adapter and supports
    gigabit. The 720x series is available with different number of chassis
    slots.

    If you are considering replacing the ATM links with gigabit ethernet
    links, then again you need to define what want the switches to *do*.

    The Cisco 2950/3550/3750 line is available in varying mixes of
    10/100 and gigabit copper and GBIC and SFP ports, from 12 to 48 ports,
    with or without Layer 3 facilities. The 2950 is layer 2 only. The
    3550 is multilayer (e.g., can route between vlans) but not stackable.
    The 3750 is multilayer and stackable. The 3550 and 3750 are fairly
    flexible devices within their limitations. The 3750G models run at
    32 Gbps if I recall correctly (and although the stacking runs
    at the same speed, if you start stacking a whole bunch of those
    together and using them hard, then you will run out of speed on
    the stacking fabric.) All of the models handle QoS; the 3550 and 3750
    also support packet classification (including policy routing.) But there
    is no ATM interface available for any of them.


    You probably have a relatively short deadline to decide whether to renew
    or not. That could tempt you to rush into ATM compatible devices now --
    but over the longer term, those devices might not be cost effective. If
    you were to just replace the existing devices with the closest Cisco gear,
    then you might not have the bandwidth you want to handle the gigabit
    later. If you go for Cisco ATM-compatable devices that support gigabit
    and have room to grow, you are likely going to end up with expensive
    equipment -- whereas if you could magically just rip out the ATM links
    and replace them instantaneously with gigabit, you might find that
    the less expensive devices such as the 3750 might be perfectly fine over
    your LAN, with ATM just needed for the WAN link. Unfortunately, in the
    real world, there are no Gigabit Brownies and you need transition plans
    with temporary dual networks as you phase in... Thus, you might find
    it best to renew the existing contract this one year but take this year to
    install the new infrastructure you want to go to. Or perhaps you could
    go month-to-month on the existing edge equipment (keeping in mind it
    is going to take months to spec out and buy samples of the equipment,
    learn to configure it on the lab bench, and move from there to full
    deployment.)

    Question: can your WAN vendor provide your WAN connection as gigabit
    instead of ATM? If so then you might eventually not need any ATM
    support at all. Our WAN link is gigabit; we used to use a Cat5509
    essentially as a glorified media convertor, but we found an
    Allied Teleson gigabit LH single mode <-> SX multimode device and now
    we can pretty much plug our WAN link directly into our firewall without
    a router. (Our WAN provider does the major routing work one hop away.)


    I would also suggest that you consider your tradeoffs between budget,
    features, speed, and Support. Some of my colleagues are enthusiastic
    about the relatively new devices from Nortel, such as the 5x00 series
    multilayer switches; they say they are twice the speed at 2/3 of the price
    of Cisco 3550/3750. But they are less flexible than the corresponding
    Cisco devices; no point in paying extra for features you aren't going
    to use, but if you need a feature and it isn't there, you have a
    problem. And Nortel support is, ummm, a little different than Cisco
    support.
    --
    When your posts are all alone / and a user's on the phone/
    there's one place to check -- / Upstream!
    When you're in a hurry / and propagation is a worry/
    there's a place you can post -- / Upstream!
     
    Walter Roberson, May 13, 2004
    #5
  6. Ned Hart

    Farouq Taj Guest

    Does anyone have any experience of IPS (Intrusion Prevension Systems) ?

    I recall at a recent presentation from NetScreen there was some mention
    of IPS which takes appropriate action rather than just produce logs. My
    thoughts at the time was that it may keep shutting down sessions and
    could prove more of a nuisance.

    Farouq.

    Ned Hart wrote:
    > Hi Walter
    >
    > Thanks for your very detailed response.
    >
    >
    > -cnrc.gc.ca (Walter Roberson) wrote in message news:<c7r2c5$6i2$>...
    >
    >>In article <>,
    >>Ned Hart <> wrote 3 different versions of...
    >>:Our WAN vendor owns and manages our edge switches and has given us the
    >>:eek:ption to install and manage our own edge switches while they continue
    >>:to provide ATM service and equipment between 8 buildings.
    >>
    >>:I have configured cisco switches, firewalls
    >>:and routers in smaller environments, but never anything that connects
    >>:to an ATM WAN so I'm a little hesitant to make a decision. I imagine
    >>:it's going to be the same, except on a larger scale.
    >>
    >>The vendor will, I'm sure, tell you exactly what PVC numbers to use,
    >>and will be responsible for keeping the ATM up and monitored, so you
    >>probably will barely notice the ATM aspects once it is configured the
    >>first time. The ATM-specific configuration required is not long; once
    >>it is in place, it just becomes a matter of setting up routing on a
    >>subinterface (or bridging of the appropriate vlan). I would, though,
    >>ask who will be responsible for the routing decisions: if what you get
    >>out of it is effectively just an internet link with the WAN vendor
    >>handling the routing, then it is pretty easy to deal with. If, though,
    >>you have to start getting into BGP or other such gateway routing
    >>protocols (which you might have to do if you have multiple WAN
    >>connections) then it does get trickier than routine LAN work. You said
    >>"switches", not "routers", so you -probably- won't have to deal with
    >>that layer.
    >>
    >>
    >>:My feeling as
    >>:that being able to manage these switches will allow me to install an
    >>:IDS, perhaps control traffic based on the application generating it,
    >>:and do many other things that I cannot do now because of the lack of
    >>:access.
    >>
    >>If you don't have an IDS now, then do you have a firewall? I would
    >>rate a firewall as a higher priority than an IDS. Unfortunately,
    >>current versions of the PIX firewall series do not support QoS
    >>(rumoured to be supported in the forthcoming 7.0), unless you get into
    >>the very expensive FWSM (Firewall Services Module) for the 6500 series.
    >>
    >>
    >>The problem with IDS's is that in order for them to be useful, someone
    >>has to actually read the logs and act on the results promptly. And
    >>these days, there are a *lot* of low-level attacks going on. We're not
    >>very big (2 x /24), and we aren't an "attractive nuisance" (e.g., we're
    >>not Microsoft or the whitehouse or grc.com), but these days we're
    >>running about 1.2 Gb of firewall logs a week. [The day 'blaster'
    >>started, we ran very close to 1 Gb on that day alone.] The bulk of the
    >>traffic is automated scans, often from remotely controlled proxies --
    >>what I call "hit and run traffic". What are you going to *do* about it?
    >>
    >>You can't really read more than a few thousand lines of IDS or
    >>firewall logs without your mind going numb -- and we're getting
    >>above 3/4 *million* lines of firewall logs per day. You simply cannot
    >>process that kind of volume without some hefty filtering algorithms
    >>that take a long time to develop... and which have to keep changing
    >>because the attack patterns keep evolving. Sure you can get tools
    >>[e.g., from Network Intelligence] that will tell you things like
    >>the top 25 attackers -- but those top 25 attackers are probably long
    >>gone by the time you generate the report. You're probably more
    >>interested in the site that's been probing 4 more of your machines a day
    >>each day for the last several days, hoping that you don't notice
    >>the scans down amongst all the other noise...
    >>
    >>IDS's are thus, in a sense, quite expensive: you have to put a lot
    >>of effort into making sense of what the logs are telling you. Don't just
    >>think you can put up snort or an IDS sensor and expect nice short
    >>little actionable reports once every couple of months: if you are
    >>exposed to the Internet, then someone/something is trying to break into your
    >>network every few -seconds-. [The last record I heard of, was that
    >>an unprotected NT-type system deliberately exposed to the 'net was
    >>infected a mere 1.6 seconds later!] You shouldn't, in my experience,
    >>be seriously considering an edge-level IDS unless you are prepared to
    >>spend a substantial amount of time analysing logs and developing
    >>log filtering & analysis programs.
    >>
    >>
    >>For completeness, I should mention that there are some commercial firms
    >>which will undertake IDS and firewall log analyses and alerting as
    >>a service. If your business has noticable assets to protect, then it
    >>might be worth going with one of those (in which case, it would probably
    >>be best to consult with them first as to what technical infrastructure
    >>they need in place.) The only such service that I can name at the
    >>moment is Counterpane, which Bruce Schneier (of Applied Cryptography
    >>fame) works for. There are probably others.
     
    Farouq Taj, May 13, 2004
    #6
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