better Kodak reorganization

Discussion in 'Digital Photography' started by Dale, May 6, 2013.

  1. [Followup-to: rec.photo.darkroom]

    Alfred Molon:

    > I also bought a Nikon scanner years ago which is
    > now catching dust on a cupboard. Haven't used it
    > for years, because using it is so complicated and
    > the quality is poor compared to digital.


    What is the exact model of your scanner? Asking in
    the hope that, maybe, you could sell it me, if it's
    working and little used. Feel free to reply e-mail.

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    Anton Shepelev, May 9, 2013
    #21
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  2. Alfred Molon:

    > > Accept my envy on having a 4000-dpi scanner.

    >
    > ... they don't sell/make them anymore?


    Seems so to me :-(

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    Anton Shepelev, May 9, 2013
    #22
    1. Advertising

  3. On 05/09/2013 12:48 AM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > In article <>,
    > says...
    >>
    >> On 05/08/2013 04:49 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
    >>> In article <79bf218c-4aab-4dce-8f0c-
    >>> >, says...
    >>>>
    >>>> On May 7, 12:48 pm, Bowser <> wrote:
    >>>>> On Mon, 6 May 2013 19:13:46 +0200, Alfred Molon
    >>>>>
    >>>>> <> wrote:
    >>>>>> In article <>, Bowser says...
    >>>>>>> Keep one thing in mind: Kodak's past management wasn't very bright.
    >>>>>>> These are they guys who once tasked their people with finding a way to
    >>>>>>> kill the digital revolution to protect their film business.
    >>>>>
    >>>>>> ... really they did? Almost too funny to be true. What plan did Kodak
    >>>>>> devise to kill digital photography?
    >>>>>
    >>>>> OK, not a CEO, but a product manager:
    >>>>>
    >>>>> http://www.luminous-landscape.com/essays/kodak_eulogy.shtml
    >>>>>
    >>>>> Still, what a moron...
    >>>>
    >>>> There are numerous examples of large companies being wholly and
    >>>> illogically resistant to change. Sony, GM, Bell, the list of
    >>>> casualties and soon-to-be casualties goes on.
    >>>
    >>> Bell was not done in by "change", it was done in by lawyers.
    >>>
    >>>

    >> In my opinion as a former employee of a Bell System subsidiary, the
    >> company was not done in by change, and lawyers may have helped do it in,
    >> but were not the primary cause.
    >>
    >> My perception is that the old timers from the time of Theodore Vail
    >> onward, who understood the business, had all died or retired, or were
    >> forced out by their age. They were replaced by business administration
    >> types whose principle achievements in college was their abilities on the
    >> football teams of second string leagues. They were all cheering, slogans
    >> (Ready, Fire, Aim was a pet peeve of mine) and win the next quarter.
    >> They did not understand the business, they had no vision beyond the next
    >> quarterly report. They wanted to boost the value of their stock options
    >> and they did not care what happened to the company afterwards. Après
    >> moi, le déluge. And that is what they got. It was so sad to see this
    >> over 100 year old institution destroyed by the rot from within. A tragedy.

    >
    > So you're saying that the MCI lawsuit that resulted in the breakup of
    > AT&T into 7 different companies and forced the divestiture of Western
    > Electric and Bell Labs was not the major factor in the decline of AT&T?
    >
    >
    >
    >

    I am not saying that. I am saying that mismanagement was the major
    factor in the decline of AT&T. The latter-day management had no vision
    of what the company could be. They played catch-up with the competition,
    so were always behind in product offerings. They bought stuff from China
    and wondered why Western Electric (later spun into Lucent) had trouble
    selling stuff. Their hardware and software in central office equipment
    was sloppy and unmanageable, so operating companies started buying stuff
    like that from Siemans and Ericcson instead. When they were finally
    allowed to make computers for other purposes than just driving
    electronic central offices, they mismanaged that so badly that they
    decided to stop that and to buy an existing computer company instead.
    They chose National Cash Register, not because they made great
    computers, but because they were cheap. After a few years of mismanaging
    NCR, they spun it off at half the price they paid for it because they
    had messed it up so bad. The Sadim touch (opposite of Midas), where
    everything they touched turned to $hit.

    I am saying (now; I did not say this in my post) that losing that
    lawsuit was a really great opportunity for the AT&T, and they wasted
    that opportunity completely.

    Getting rid of the 7 operating companies meant getting rid of the high
    cost, labor intensive, regulated, low-profit local telephone service
    part of the business, and keeping Bell Labs, Western Electric, Long
    Lines, the defense business, and so on. These were all capital
    intensive, low labor cost, high profit parts of the business. They would
    also get rid of a lot of the overhead and excess management of running
    the operating companies, so the remaining management could take care of
    running the remaining business.

    And the Operating Companies also messed up their opportunity. Bell Labs
    was split into two parts, one retained by AT&T, and one jointly owned by
    the 7 operating companies (BellCore). BellCore could have cut the
    thickness of one 6 or 7 inch thick book of rules and regulations to
    about 2 inches (The G.E.I.), but they did not. They had all the same bad
    management as the AT&T part had. And since the operating companies did
    not manufacture anything, they had trouble supporting BellCore
    financially since they could not justify it to all the Public Utility
    Commissions. So they didn't support it. I do not know if BellCore even
    exists anymore. There are descendants of descendants of BellCore but
    just as the present AT&T has little in common with the old one, the
    present descendant has little to do with communication research.
     
    Jean-David Beyer, May 9, 2013
    #23
  4. Alfred Molon:

    > > What is the exact model of your scanner? Asking
    > > in the hope that, maybe, you could sell it me,
    > > if it's working and little used. Feel free to
    > > reply e-mail.

    >
    > The LS50 ED (also known as V ED). And, holy shit,
    > it's amazing what this thing fetches on ebay (just
    > had a look).


    Oh, and I needed a one that'd accept 120 film. The
    prices are indeed insane. The thread talks about
    Kodak fighting with digital but isn't Nikon fighting
    with film by discountinuing so highly-demanded a
    product?

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    Anton Shepelev, May 9, 2013
    #24
  5. Anton Shepelev wrote:
    > Oh, and I needed a one that'd accept 120 film. The
    > prices are indeed insane. The thread talks about
    > Kodak fighting with digital but isn't Nikon fighting
    > with film by discountinuing so highly-demanded a
    > product?
    >


    It's not a high demand product. It's a long dead product that a few people
    want to have and are willing to pay a high price for.

    Nikon can't make a profit selling 100 scanners. They would have to sell
    thousands of them and the demand is not that high.

    In 20 years there probably will be a resurgence of film scanning from
    people finding old family negatives in the attic when their parents
    or grandparents die.

    By then I expect that the scanner will take a strip of film, automatically
    determine best focus and exposure, split the frames, correct color, remove
    dust, and do facial and place recognition to tag it.

    However I doubt that there will be much demand for an "artistic" scanner
    which just does a straight scan such as the current ones.

    Geoff.

    --
    Geoffrey S. Mendelson, N3OWJ/4X1GM/KBUH7245/KBUW5379
    It's Spring here in Jerusalem!!!
     
    Geoffrey S. Mendelson, May 9, 2013
    #25
  6. Geoffrey S. Mendelson:

    > > Oh, and I needed a one that'd accept 120 film.
    > > The prices are indeed insane. The thread talks
    > > about Kodak fighting with digital but isn't
    > > Nikon fighting with film by discountinuing so
    > > highly-demanded a product?

    >
    > It's not a high demand product. It's a long dead
    > product that a few people want to have and are
    > willing to pay a high price for.
    >
    > Nikon can't make a profit selling 100 scanners.
    > They would have to sell thousands of them and the
    > demand is not that high.


    Whence did you take that fact? My reasoning for a
    high demand was the following:

    1. Nikon ran out of stock of its scanners soon
    after it had discontinued them.

    2. The prices on them on eBay and elsewhere
    started to grow not many years later, as it is
    with collectable items, but again, almost im-
    mediately.

    3. I have seen a lot of people complain about
    this on various forums, and considering that
    only a small portion of the interested takes
    care to express their concerns, there seems to
    be a lot of them.

    A true example of low demand is our Krasnogorsk film
    cameras, and specificlly the Zenit 122:

    http://camerapedia.wikia.com/wiki/Zenit_122
    http://www.cameramanuals.org/russian_pdf/zenit_122.pdf

    I visited KMZ's shop and exhibition center just the
    day before yesterday and was quite amazed to find
    new 122s sold for just 1650 rubles, or 55 dollars!
    And that's for a good mechanical camera with a TTL
    light meter and a very good Zenitar 2/50 lens
    -- that's low demand, for a camera that has long
    been discountinued. With Nikon film scanners the
    situation is different.

    > By then I expect that the scanner will take a
    > strip of film, automatically determine best focus
    > and exposure, split the frames, correct color, re-
    > move dust, and do facial and place recognition to
    > tag it.
    >
    > However I doubt that there will be much demand for
    > an "artistic" scanner which just does a straight
    > scan such as the current ones.


    I just hate when a device insists on doing more than
    I want from it. If those functions will be bypass-
    able, that will be all right by me. I care more
    about how well a scanner does its main job, and am
    unwilling to pay for other loosely related features,
    so I find this whole trend a negative one. And col-
    or correction may be quite a subjective thing. Cor-
    recting colors in Photoshop after the scanner soft-
    ware has already corrected them at its will, proba-
    bly destroying color integrity:

    http://www.c-f-systems.com/ColorIntegrity.html

    is at least ugly. I don't want to correct a correc-
    tion.

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    Anton Shepelev, May 9, 2013
    #26
  7. Dale

    J. Clarke Guest

    In article <>,
    says...
    >
    > J. Clarke:
    >
    > > > Here is an example scan from the Nikon scanner:
    > > > http://www.molon.de/images/F21_35.jpg

    > >
    > > I think your scanner is busticated. It looks like
    > > the green on the left side of that shot is way,
    > > way out of register.

    >
    > This has nothing to do with the scanner itself. It
    > only has a linear CCD array accepting light from
    > red, green, and blue LEDs, whose intensity may be
    > individually adjusted so that, say, a near-transpar-
    > ent region on the film scans as nearly white (245,
    > 245, 245). This gives a good starting point for
    > white balance and allows for a more effective use of
    > the scanner's dynamic range in all channels.
    >
    > But the device has no knowledge of color spaces and
    > converts the result to a user-selectable color space
    > using some "film profile". I avoid it and scan into
    > linear RGB, without any color-space conversions.
    > Vuescan lets me do it. The result is an RGB image
    > obtained by downmixing raw data from the CCD.
    >
    > To open that image properly in Photoshop, a linear
    > (gamma=1.0) color space should be defined. Note,
    > that inverting a negative is not a linear operation
    > and should be done as:
    >
    > y = 1 / x.


    So what? Your discussioin of color spaces has nothing to do with
    anything that I said or with the problem I see in that image.
     
    J. Clarke, May 9, 2013
    #27
  8. Dale

    PeterN Guest

    On 5/8/2013 10:45 PM, Jean-David Beyer wrote:
    > On 05/08/2013 04:49 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
    >> In article <79bf218c-4aab-4dce-8f0c-
    >> >, says...
    >>>
    >>> On May 7, 12:48 pm, Bowser <> wrote:
    >>>> On Mon, 6 May 2013 19:13:46 +0200, Alfred Molon
    >>>>
    >>>> <> wrote:
    >>>>> In article <>, Bowser says...
    >>>>>> Keep one thing in mind: Kodak's past management wasn't very bright.
    >>>>>> These are they guys who once tasked their people with finding a way to
    >>>>>> kill the digital revolution to protect their film business.
    >>>>
    >>>>> ... really they did? Almost too funny to be true. What plan did Kodak
    >>>>> devise to kill digital photography?
    >>>>
    >>>> OK, not a CEO, but a product manager:
    >>>>
    >>>> http://www.luminous-landscape.com/essays/kodak_eulogy.shtml
    >>>>
    >>>> Still, what a moron...
    >>>
    >>> There are numerous examples of large companies being wholly and
    >>> illogically resistant to change. Sony, GM, Bell, the list of
    >>> casualties and soon-to-be casualties goes on.

    >>
    >> Bell was not done in by "change", it was done in by lawyers.
    >>
    >>

    > In my opinion as a former employee of a Bell System subsidiary, the
    > company was not done in by change, and lawyers may have helped do it in,
    > but were not the primary cause.
    >
    > My perception is that the old timers from the time of Theodore Vail
    > onward, who understood the business, had all died or retired, or were
    > forced out by their age. They were replaced by business administration
    > types whose principle achievements in college was their abilities on the
    > football teams of second string leagues. They were all cheering, slogans
    > (Ready, Fire, Aim was a pet peeve of mine) and win the next quarter.
    > They did not understand the business, they had no vision beyond the next
    > quarterly report. They wanted to boost the value of their stock options
    > and they did not care what happened to the company afterwards. Après
    > moi, le déluge. And that is what they got. It was so sad to see this
    > over 100 year old institution destroyed by the rot from within. A tragedy.
    >


    A prime example of the inherent flaw of the B school game, taught in
    every B school.

    --
    PeterN
     
    PeterN, May 9, 2013
    #28
  9. Dale

    PeterN Guest

    On 5/9/2013 12:48 AM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > In article <>,
    > says...
    >>
    >> On 05/08/2013 04:49 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
    >>> In article <79bf218c-4aab-4dce-8f0c-
    >>> >, says...
    >>>>
    >>>> On May 7, 12:48 pm, Bowser <> wrote:
    >>>>> On Mon, 6 May 2013 19:13:46 +0200, Alfred Molon
    >>>>>
    >>>>> <> wrote:
    >>>>>> In article <>, Bowser says...
    >>>>>>> Keep one thing in mind: Kodak's past management wasn't very bright.
    >>>>>>> These are they guys who once tasked their people with finding a way to
    >>>>>>> kill the digital revolution to protect their film business.
    >>>>>
    >>>>>> ... really they did? Almost too funny to be true. What plan did Kodak
    >>>>>> devise to kill digital photography?
    >>>>>
    >>>>> OK, not a CEO, but a product manager:
    >>>>>
    >>>>> http://www.luminous-landscape.com/essays/kodak_eulogy.shtml
    >>>>>
    >>>>> Still, what a moron...
    >>>>
    >>>> There are numerous examples of large companies being wholly and
    >>>> illogically resistant to change. Sony, GM, Bell, the list of
    >>>> casualties and soon-to-be casualties goes on.
    >>>
    >>> Bell was not done in by "change", it was done in by lawyers.
    >>>
    >>>

    >> In my opinion as a former employee of a Bell System subsidiary, the
    >> company was not done in by change, and lawyers may have helped do it in,
    >> but were not the primary cause.
    >>
    >> My perception is that the old timers from the time of Theodore Vail
    >> onward, who understood the business, had all died or retired, or were
    >> forced out by their age. They were replaced by business administration
    >> types whose principle achievements in college was their abilities on the
    >> football teams of second string leagues. They were all cheering, slogans
    >> (Ready, Fire, Aim was a pet peeve of mine) and win the next quarter.
    >> They did not understand the business, they had no vision beyond the next
    >> quarterly report. They wanted to boost the value of their stock options
    >> and they did not care what happened to the company afterwards. Après
    >> moi, le déluge. And that is what they got. It was so sad to see this
    >> over 100 year old institution destroyed by the rot from within. A tragedy.

    >
    > So you're saying that the MCI lawsuit that resulted in the breakup of
    > AT&T into 7 different companies and forced the divestiture of Western
    > Electric and Bell Labs was not the major factor in the decline of AT&T?
    >


    See my prior post. It was not. The problem is when you put money into
    research and development, it adversely impacts the bottom line, for
    accounting purposes. Lower bottom line = lower bonuses for management.


    --
    PeterN
     
    PeterN, May 9, 2013
    #29
  10. Dale

    J. Clarke Guest

    In article <>,
    says...
    >
    > On 05/09/2013 12:48 AM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > > In article <>,
    > > says...
    > >>
    > >> On 05/08/2013 04:49 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > >>> In article <79bf218c-4aab-4dce-8f0c-
    > >>> >, says...
    > >>>>
    > >>>> On May 7, 12:48 pm, Bowser <> wrote:
    > >>>>> On Mon, 6 May 2013 19:13:46 +0200, Alfred Molon
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>> <> wrote:
    > >>>>>> In article <>, Bowser says...
    > >>>>>>> Keep one thing in mind: Kodak's past management wasn't very bright.
    > >>>>>>> These are they guys who once tasked their people with finding a way to
    > >>>>>>> kill the digital revolution to protect their film business.
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>>> ... really they did? Almost too funny to be true. What plan did Kodak
    > >>>>>> devise to kill digital photography?
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>> OK, not a CEO, but a product manager:
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>> http://www.luminous-landscape.com/essays/kodak_eulogy.shtml
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>> Still, what a moron...
    > >>>>
    > >>>> There are numerous examples of large companies being wholly and
    > >>>> illogically resistant to change. Sony, GM, Bell, the list of
    > >>>> casualties and soon-to-be casualties goes on.
    > >>>
    > >>> Bell was not done in by "change", it was done in by lawyers.
    > >>>
    > >>>
    > >> In my opinion as a former employee of a Bell System subsidiary, the
    > >> company was not done in by change, and lawyers may have helped do it in,
    > >> but were not the primary cause.
    > >>
    > >> My perception is that the old timers from the time of Theodore Vail
    > >> onward, who understood the business, had all died or retired, or were
    > >> forced out by their age. They were replaced by business administration
    > >> types whose principle achievements in college was their abilities on the
    > >> football teams of second string leagues. They were all cheering, slogans
    > >> (Ready, Fire, Aim was a pet peeve of mine) and win the next quarter.
    > >> They did not understand the business, they had no vision beyond the next
    > >> quarterly report. They wanted to boost the value of their stock options
    > >> and they did not care what happened to the company afterwards. Après
    > >> moi, le déluge. And that is what they got. It was so sad to see this
    > >> over 100 year old institution destroyed by the rot from within. A tragedy.

    > >
    > > So you're saying that the MCI lawsuit that resulted in the breakup of
    > > AT&T into 7 different companies and forced the divestiture of Western
    > > Electric and Bell Labs was not the major factor in the decline of AT&T?
    > >
    > >
    > >
    > >

    > I am not saying that. I am saying that mismanagement was the major
    > factor in the decline of AT&T.


    Well then you are saying that that the lawsuit was not the major factor
    so why did you say that you were not saying that?

    > The latter-day management had no vision
    > of what the company could be.


    They had no choice. The Justice Department decided what it could be.

    > They played catch-up with the competition,
    > so were always behind in product offerings.


    They had no competition until the lawsuit.

    > They bought stuff from China
    > and wondered why Western Electric (later spun into Lucent) had trouble
    > selling stuff.


    "Selling stuff" was a small part of their business.

    > Their hardware and software in central office equipment
    > was sloppy and unmanageable, so operating companies started buying stuff
    > like that from Siemans and Ericcson instead.


    There were no "Operating Companies" until after the lawsuit.

    > When they were finally
    > allowed to make computers for other purposes than just driving
    > electronic central offices, they mismanaged that so badly that they
    > decided to stop that and to buy an existing computer company instead.


    They wouldn't have had to make computers for any other purpose without
    the lawsuit.

    > They chose National Cash Register, not because they made great
    > computers, but because they were cheap. After a few years of mismanaging
    > NCR, they spun it off at half the price they paid for it because they
    > had messed it up so bad. The Sadim touch (opposite of Midas), where
    > everything they touched turned to $hit.
    >
    > I am saying (now; I did not say this in my post) that losing that
    > lawsuit was a really great opportunity for the AT&T, and they wasted
    > that opportunity completely.


    Only if you want them to be something other than what they were, the
    telephone company.

    > Getting rid of the 7 operating companies meant getting rid of the high
    > cost, labor intensive, regulated, low-profit local telephone service
    > part of the business, and keeping Bell Labs, Western Electric, Long
    > Lines, the defense business, and so on. These were all capital
    > intensive, low labor cost, high profit parts of the business. They would
    > also get rid of a lot of the overhead and excess management of running
    > the operating companies, so the remaining management could take care of
    > running the remaining business.


    Except that they were not allowed to keep Western Electric or Bell Labs.
    And they lost their monopoly on long-distance as well which meant that
    their resources were far less than they had been.

    > And the Operating Companies also messed up their opportunity. Bell Labs
    > was split into two parts, one retained by AT&T, and one jointly owned by
    > the 7 operating companies (BellCore).


    How was this an "opportunity"?

    > BellCore could have cut the
    > thickness of one 6 or 7 inch thick book of rules and regulations to
    > about 2 inches (The G.E.I.), but they did not. They had all the same bad
    > management as the AT&T part had. And since the operating companies did
    > not manufacture anything, they had trouble supporting BellCore
    > financially since they could not justify it to all the Public Utility
    > Commissions. So they didn't support it. I do not know if BellCore even
    > exists anymore. There are descendants of descendants of BellCore but
    > just as the present AT&T has little in common with the old one, the
    > present descendant has little to do with communication research.


    And all due to the lawsuit.

    Every single "problem" you list is the result of the actions of MCI's
    lawyers.
     
    J. Clarke, May 9, 2013
    #30
  11. J. Clarke:

    > > > I think your scanner is busticated. It looks
    > > > like the green on the left side of that shot
    > > > is way, way out of register.

    > >
    > > This has nothing to do with the scanner itself.
    > > [...]

    >
    > So what? Your discussioin of color spaces has
    > nothing to do with anything that I said or with
    > the problem I see in that image.


    I thought that the defect you talk about is that of
    the scanner software rather than hardware. What do
    you mean by "out of register"?

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    () ascii ribbon campaign - against html e-mail
    /\ www.asciiribbon.org - against proprietary attachments
     
    Anton Shepelev, May 9, 2013
    #31
  12. On 05/09/2013 01:02 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > In article <>,
    > says...
    >>
    >> On 05/09/2013 12:48 AM, J. Clarke wrote:
    >>> In article <>,
    >>> says...
    >>>>
    >>>> On 05/08/2013 04:49 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
    >>>>> In article <79bf218c-4aab-4dce-8f0c-
    >>>>> >, says...
    >>>>>>
    >>>>>> On May 7, 12:48 pm, Bowser <> wrote:
    >>>>>>> On Mon, 6 May 2013 19:13:46 +0200, Alfred Molon
    >>>>>>>
    >>>>>>> <> wrote:
    >>>>>>>> In article <>, Bowser says...
    >>>>>>>>> Keep one thing in mind: Kodak's past management wasn't very bright.
    >>>>>>>>> These are they guys who once tasked their people with finding a way to
    >>>>>>>>> kill the digital revolution to protect their film business.
    >>>>>>>
    >>>>>>>> ... really they did? Almost too funny to be true. What plan did Kodak
    >>>>>>>> devise to kill digital photography?
    >>>>>>>
    >>>>>>> OK, not a CEO, but a product manager:
    >>>>>>>
    >>>>>>> http://www.luminous-landscape.com/essays/kodak_eulogy.shtml
    >>>>>>>
    >>>>>>> Still, what a moron...
    >>>>>>
    >>>>>> There are numerous examples of large companies being wholly and
    >>>>>> illogically resistant to change. Sony, GM, Bell, the list of
    >>>>>> casualties and soon-to-be casualties goes on.
    >>>>>
    >>>>> Bell was not done in by "change", it was done in by lawyers.
    >>>>>
    >>>>>
    >>>> In my opinion as a former employee of a Bell System subsidiary, the
    >>>> company was not done in by change, and lawyers may have helped do it in,
    >>>> but were not the primary cause.
    >>>>
    >>>> My perception is that the old timers from the time of Theodore Vail
    >>>> onward, who understood the business, had all died or retired, or were
    >>>> forced out by their age. They were replaced by business administration
    >>>> types whose principle achievements in college was their abilities on the
    >>>> football teams of second string leagues. They were all cheering, slogans
    >>>> (Ready, Fire, Aim was a pet peeve of mine) and win the next quarter.
    >>>> They did not understand the business, they had no vision beyond the next
    >>>> quarterly report. They wanted to boost the value of their stock options
    >>>> and they did not care what happened to the company afterwards. Après
    >>>> moi, le déluge. And that is what they got. It was so sad to see this
    >>>> over 100 year old institution destroyed by the rot from within. A tragedy.
    >>>
    >>> So you're saying that the MCI lawsuit that resulted in the breakup of
    >>> AT&T into 7 different companies and forced the divestiture of Western
    >>> Electric and Bell Labs was not the major factor in the decline of AT&T?
    >>>
    >>>
    >>>
    >>>

    >> I am not saying that. I am saying that mismanagement was the major
    >> factor in the decline of AT&T.

    >
    > Well then you are saying that that the lawsuit was not the major factor
    > so why did you say that you were not saying that?


    I said that the lawsuit was not a major factor in the breakup. The
    company was mismanaged seriously starting around 1970 any you cannot
    blame that on a lawsuit later. AT&T did not learn the lesson of the
    Carterphone decision years before and it was downhill ever since.
    >
    >> The latter-day management had no vision
    >> of what the company could be.

    >
    > They had no choice. The Justice Department decided what it could be.


    That breakup was negotiated between AT&T and the Justice Department. It
    made things simpler for both sides. AT&T did not think they could get
    away with unloading the operating companies and keep the high profit
    stuff. The Justice Department did not really understand that and just
    accepted things.
    >
    >> They played catch-up with the competition,
    >> so were always behind in product offerings.

    >
    > They had no competition until the lawsuit.


    Sure there was. What became SPRINT was around. It was a private network
    for the Southern Pacific Railroad, in direct competition with Long Lines.
    >
    >> They bought stuff from China
    >> and wondered why Western Electric (later spun into Lucent) had trouble
    >> selling stuff.

    >
    > "Selling stuff" was a small part of their business.


    Selling stuff was the Entire business of Western Electric. They sold all
    the equipment the operating companies used except maybe toilet paper and
    Scotch Tape. Central Offices, PBXs, telephones, wire, ...
    >
    >> Their hardware and software in central office equipment
    >> was sloppy and unmanageable, so operating companies started buying stuff
    >> like that from Siemans and Ericcson instead.

    >
    > There were no "Operating Companies" until after the lawsuit.


    If I remember correctly, there were 22 operating companies before. E.g.,
    New England Bell, New York Telephone, New Jersey Bell, Chesapeake and
    Potomac, Southern Bell, South Central Bell, South Western Bell,
    >
    >> When they were finally
    >> allowed to make computers for other purposes than just driving
    >> electronic central offices, they mismanaged that so badly that they
    >> decided to stop that and to buy an existing computer company instead.

    >
    > They wouldn't have had to make computers for any other purpose without
    > the lawsuit.


    Sure they would. They used lots of computers internally, and they wanted
    to sell them. They were early pioneers in making computers even before
    WW-II. They made of the first transistorized computers. About that time,
    in an earlier case, the Justice Department made them stop making
    computers, and the teams working on them were broken up, partly by mass
    resignations of people who went to work for independent computer
    manufacturers.
    >
    >> They chose National Cash Register, not because they made great
    >> computers, but because they were cheap. After a few years of mismanaging
    >> NCR, they spun it off at half the price they paid for it because they
    >> had messed it up so bad. The Sadim touch (opposite of Midas), where
    >> everything they touched turned to $hit.
    >>
    >> I am saying (now; I did not say this in my post) that losing that
    >> lawsuit was a really great opportunity for the AT&T, and they wasted
    >> that opportunity completely.

    >
    > Only if you want them to be something other than what they were, the
    > telephone company.


    They were much much more than a telephone company. They engaged in much
    fundamental research only tangentially related to telephones. For
    example, Davisson and Germer's discovery that electrons were both waves
    and particles (Nobel prize in physics), Ives' discovery of retardation
    of atomic clocks, invention of transistor instead of just making better
    telephone relays, ...

    RCA had a similar problem at Sarnoff Research Center. The bean counters
    did not realize how important research was (as contrasted to short-term
    product development) and wanted to close it down to improve short term
    profits. Now RCA is no more. They had to get out of the computer
    business even though they knew it was their future. They realized that a
    large proportion of their products were the results of work done in the
    previous 10 years at Sarnoff, but the bean counters won.
    >
    >> Getting rid of the 7 operating companies meant getting rid of the high
    >> cost, labor intensive, regulated, low-profit local telephone service
    >> part of the business, and keeping Bell Labs, Western Electric, Long
    >> Lines, the defense business, and so on. These were all capital
    >> intensive, low labor cost, high profit parts of the business. They would
    >> also get rid of a lot of the overhead and excess management of running
    >> the operating companies, so the remaining management could take care of
    >> running the remaining business.

    >
    > Except that they were not allowed to keep Western Electric or Bell Labs.


    AT&T was allowed to keep Western Electric and Bell Labs. And they did
    keep both until years later when they spun off Verizon, and Verizon got
    them. That did not work out well and Alcatel bought Verizon, and now
    Alcatel is not doing well.

    > And they lost their monopoly on long-distance as well which meant that
    > their resources were far less than they had been.
    >
    >> And the Operating Companies also messed up their opportunity. Bell Labs
    >> was split into two parts, one retained by AT&T, and one jointly owned by
    >> the 7 operating companies (BellCore).

    >
    > How was this an "opportunity"?


    BellCore could have dumped the unwhieldy G.E.I, streamlined management,
    and managed the company. They could have become the leaders they once
    were back when AT&T was well managed by people like Vail. But instead
    they got Charlie Brown and Robert Allen.
    >
    >> BellCore could have cut the
    >> thickness of one 6 or 7 inch thick book of rules and regulations to
    >> about 2 inches (The G.E.I.), but they did not. They had all the same bad
    >> management as the AT&T part had. And since the operating companies did
    >> not manufacture anything, they had trouble supporting BellCore
    >> financially since they could not justify it to all the Public Utility
    >> Commissions. So they didn't support it. I do not know if BellCore even
    >> exists anymore. There are descendants of descendants of BellCore but
    >> just as the present AT&T has little in common with the old one, the
    >> present descendant has little to do with communication research.

    >
    > And all due to the lawsuit.
    >
    > Every single "problem" you list is the result of the actions of MCI's
    > lawyers.
    >
    >
    >
    >


    Nonsense. They played a part, but AT&T would have fallen apart
    regardless. It might have taken a little longer.
     
    Jean-David Beyer, May 9, 2013
    #32
  13. Dale

    Martin Brown Guest

    On 09/05/2013 18:41, Anton Shepelev wrote:
    > J. Clarke:
    >
    >>>> I think your scanner is busticated. It looks
    >>>> like the green on the left side of that shot
    >>>> is way, way out of register.
    >>>
    >>> This has nothing to do with the scanner itself.
    >>> [...]

    >>
    >> So what? Your discussioin of color spaces has
    >> nothing to do with anything that I said or with
    >> the problem I see in that image.

    >
    > I thought that the defect you talk about is that of
    > the scanner software rather than hardware. What do
    > you mean by "out of register"?


    It is most obvious in the green inner fringes on highlights in
    the left of the image, but also present as green inner and purple
    outer fringes on highlights in the right top corner. Most easily
    seen in the trees just past the roof line of the barn. Zoom in...

    Looks to me like uncorrected lateral colour aberration.
    (ie a lens used to take the image flaw)

    Put simply the green image is slightly smaller than red and blue!
    I don't see how this can be a scanner fault.

    --
    Regards,
    Martin Brown
     
    Martin Brown, May 9, 2013
    #33
  14. Dale

    J. Clarke Guest

    In article <518bd642$0$10770$-secrets.com>,
    says...
    >
    > On 5/9/2013 12:48 AM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > > In article <>,
    > > says...
    > >>
    > >> On 05/08/2013 04:49 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > >>> In article <79bf218c-4aab-4dce-8f0c-
    > >>> >, says...
    > >>>>
    > >>>> On May 7, 12:48 pm, Bowser <> wrote:
    > >>>>> On Mon, 6 May 2013 19:13:46 +0200, Alfred Molon
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>> <> wrote:
    > >>>>>> In article <>, Bowser says...
    > >>>>>>> Keep one thing in mind: Kodak's past management wasn't very bright.
    > >>>>>>> These are they guys who once tasked their people with finding a way to
    > >>>>>>> kill the digital revolution to protect their film business.
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>>> ... really they did? Almost too funny to be true. What plan did Kodak
    > >>>>>> devise to kill digital photography?
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>> OK, not a CEO, but a product manager:
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>> http://www.luminous-landscape.com/essays/kodak_eulogy.shtml
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>> Still, what a moron...
    > >>>>
    > >>>> There are numerous examples of large companies being wholly and
    > >>>> illogically resistant to change. Sony, GM, Bell, the list of
    > >>>> casualties and soon-to-be casualties goes on.
    > >>>
    > >>> Bell was not done in by "change", it was done in by lawyers.
    > >>>
    > >>>
    > >> In my opinion as a former employee of a Bell System subsidiary, the
    > >> company was not done in by change, and lawyers may have helped do it in,
    > >> but were not the primary cause.
    > >>
    > >> My perception is that the old timers from the time of Theodore Vail
    > >> onward, who understood the business, had all died or retired, or were
    > >> forced out by their age. They were replaced by business administration
    > >> types whose principle achievements in college was their abilities on the
    > >> football teams of second string leagues. They were all cheering, slogans
    > >> (Ready, Fire, Aim was a pet peeve of mine) and win the next quarter.
    > >> They did not understand the business, they had no vision beyond the next
    > >> quarterly report. They wanted to boost the value of their stock options
    > >> and they did not care what happened to the company afterwards. Après
    > >> moi, le déluge. And that is what they got. It was so sad to see this
    > >> over 100 year old institution destroyed by the rot from within. A tragedy.

    > >
    > > So you're saying that the MCI lawsuit that resulted in the breakup of
    > > AT&T into 7 different companies and forced the divestiture of Western
    > > Electric and Bell Labs was not the major factor in the decline of AT&T?
    > >

    >
    > See my prior post. It was not. The problem is when you put money into
    > research and development, it adversely impacts the bottom line, for
    > accounting purposes. Lower bottom line = lower bonuses for management.


    While you can accuse AT&T of many things, giving research short shrift
    is not one of them. Their research department produced Unix, the C
    programming language, the laser, the transistor, the CCD, and 7 Nobel
    Prizes, and all of that was in addition to the work that actually
    affected the bottom line.
     
    J. Clarke, May 10, 2013
    #34
  15. Dale

    J. Clarke Guest

    In article <>, says...
    >
    > PeterN <> wrote:
    > >On 5/9/2013 12:48 AM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > >> So you're saying that the MCI lawsuit that resulted in the breakup of
    > >> AT&T into 7 different companies and forced the divestiture of Western
    > >> Electric and Bell Labs was not the major factor in the decline of AT&T?
    > >>

    > >
    > >See my prior post. It was not. The problem is when you
    > >put money into research and development, it adversely
    > >impacts the bottom line, for accounting purposes. Lower
    > >bottom line = lower bonuses for management.

    >
    > Neither of those descriptions relate to the history of AT&T.
    >
    > Think "Information Age". In 1940 it was a company based
    > on the economics of message traffic. By 1960 there were
    > predictions on when revenue from message traffic would
    > drop below revenue from byte oriented data traffic.
    >
    > Corporate AT&T was frozen and unable to respond to the
    > changes that occured as those predictions became true.
    >
    > Literally within months of the day the data traffic
    > revenues rose above message traffic revenues the AT&T
    > Board of Directors threw in the towel, disolved the
    > company as it existed, sold off the parts, and went
    > home.


    Now that is a fine piece of revisionism.
     
    J. Clarke, May 10, 2013
    #35
  16. Dale

    J. Clarke Guest

    In article <>,
    says...
    >
    > On 05/09/2013 01:02 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > > In article <>,
    > > says...
    > >>
    > >> On 05/09/2013 12:48 AM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > >>> In article <>,
    > >>> says...
    > >>>>
    > >>>> On 05/08/2013 04:49 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > >>>>> In article <79bf218c-4aab-4dce-8f0c-
    > >>>>> >, says...
    > >>>>>>
    > >>>>>> On May 7, 12:48 pm, Bowser <> wrote:
    > >>>>>>> On Mon, 6 May 2013 19:13:46 +0200, Alfred Molon
    > >>>>>>>
    > >>>>>>> <> wrote:
    > >>>>>>>> In article <>, Bowser says...
    > >>>>>>>>> Keep one thing in mind: Kodak's past management wasn't very bright.
    > >>>>>>>>> These are they guys who once tasked their people with finding a way to
    > >>>>>>>>> kill the digital revolution to protect their film business.
    > >>>>>>>
    > >>>>>>>> ... really they did? Almost too funny to be true. What plan did Kodak
    > >>>>>>>> devise to kill digital photography?
    > >>>>>>>
    > >>>>>>> OK, not a CEO, but a product manager:
    > >>>>>>>
    > >>>>>>> http://www.luminous-landscape.com/essays/kodak_eulogy.shtml
    > >>>>>>>
    > >>>>>>> Still, what a moron...
    > >>>>>>
    > >>>>>> There are numerous examples of large companies being wholly and
    > >>>>>> illogically resistant to change. Sony, GM, Bell, the list of
    > >>>>>> casualties and soon-to-be casualties goes on.
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>> Bell was not done in by "change", it was done in by lawyers.
    > >>>>>
    > >>>>>
    > >>>> In my opinion as a former employee of a Bell System subsidiary, the
    > >>>> company was not done in by change, and lawyers may have helped do it in,
    > >>>> but were not the primary cause.
    > >>>>
    > >>>> My perception is that the old timers from the time of Theodore Vail
    > >>>> onward, who understood the business, had all died or retired, or were
    > >>>> forced out by their age. They were replaced by business administration
    > >>>> types whose principle achievements in college was their abilities on the
    > >>>> football teams of second string leagues. They were all cheering, slogans
    > >>>> (Ready, Fire, Aim was a pet peeve of mine) and win the next quarter.
    > >>>> They did not understand the business, they had no vision beyond the next
    > >>>> quarterly report. They wanted to boost the value of their stock options
    > >>>> and they did not care what happened to the company afterwards. Après
    > >>>> moi, le déluge. And that is what they got. It was so sad to see this
    > >>>> over 100 year old institution destroyed by the rot from within. A tragedy.
    > >>>
    > >>> So you're saying that the MCI lawsuit that resulted in the breakup of
    > >>> AT&T into 7 different companies and forced the divestiture of Western
    > >>> Electric and Bell Labs was not the major factor in the decline of AT&T?
    > >>>
    > >>>
    > >>>
    > >>>
    > >> I am not saying that. I am saying that mismanagement was the major
    > >> factor in the decline of AT&T.

    > >
    > > Well then you are saying that that the lawsuit was not the major factor
    > > so why did you say that you were not saying that?

    >
    > I said that the lawsuit was not a major factor in the breakup. The
    > company was mismanaged seriously starting around 1970 any you cannot
    > blame that on a lawsuit later. AT&T did not learn the lesson of the
    > Carterphone decision years before and it was downhill ever since.
    > >
    > >> The latter-day management had no vision
    > >> of what the company could be.

    > >
    > > They had no choice. The Justice Department decided what it could be.

    >
    > That breakup was negotiated between AT&T and the Justice Department. It
    > made things simpler for both sides. AT&T did not think they could get
    > away with unloading the operating companies and keep the high profit
    > stuff. The Justice Department did not really understand that and just
    > accepted things.
    > >
    > >> They played catch-up with the competition,
    > >> so were always behind in product offerings.

    > >
    > > They had no competition until the lawsuit.

    >
    > Sure there was. What became SPRINT was around. It was a private network
    > for the Southern Pacific Railroad, in direct competition with Long Lines.


    How did it go about competing when there was no way to get a phone call
    onto SPRINT's lines other than through AT&T?

    > >> They bought stuff from China
    > >> and wondered why Western Electric (later spun into Lucent) had trouble
    > >> selling stuff.

    > >
    > > "Selling stuff" was a small part of their business.

    >
    > Selling stuff was the Entire business of Western Electric. They sold all
    > the equipment the operating companies used except maybe toilet paper and
    > Scotch Tape. Central Offices, PBXs, telephones, wire, ...


    After the lawsuit.

    > >> Their hardware and software in central office equipment
    > >> was sloppy and unmanageable, so operating companies started buying stuff
    > >> like that from Siemans and Ericcson instead.

    > >
    > > There were no "Operating Companies" until after the lawsuit.

    >
    > If I remember correctly, there were 22 operating companies before. E.g.,
    > New England Bell, New York Telephone, New Jersey Bell, Chesapeake and
    > Potomac, Southern Bell, South Central Bell, South Western Bell,


    All subsidiaries of AT&T.

    > >> When they were finally
    > >> allowed to make computers for other purposes than just driving
    > >> electronic central offices, they mismanaged that so badly that they
    > >> decided to stop that and to buy an existing computer company instead.

    > >
    > > They wouldn't have had to make computers for any other purpose without
    > > the lawsuit.

    >
    > Sure they would.


    Why?

    > They used lots of computers internally, and they wanted
    > to sell them.


    Which would be moving away from their core competency.

    > They were early pioneers in making computers even before
    > WW-II.


    Do tell us about the computer that AT&T made before WWII.

    > They made of the first transistorized computers. About that time,
    > in an earlier case, the Justice Department made them stop making
    > computers, and the teams working on them were broken up, partly by mass
    > resignations of people who went to work for independent computer
    > manufacturers.
    > >
    > >> They chose National Cash Register, not because they made great
    > >> computers, but because they were cheap. After a few years of mismanaging
    > >> NCR, they spun it off at half the price they paid for it because they
    > >> had messed it up so bad. The Sadim touch (opposite of Midas), where
    > >> everything they touched turned to $hit.
    > >>
    > >> I am saying (now; I did not say this in my post) that losing that
    > >> lawsuit was a really great opportunity for the AT&T, and they wasted
    > >> that opportunity completely.

    > >
    > > Only if you want them to be something other than what they were, the
    > > telephone company.

    >
    > They were much much more than a telephone company.


    They were the telephone company. That was their core competency.

    > They engaged in much
    > fundamental research only tangentially related to telephones. For
    > example, Davisson and Germer's discovery that electrons were both waves
    > and particles (Nobel prize in physics), Ives' discovery of retardation
    > of atomic clocks, invention of transistor instead of just making better
    > telephone relays, ...


    A couple of posts earlier you said they neglected research. You're
    talking out of both sides of your mouth here.

    > RCA had a similar problem at Sarnoff Research Center. The bean

    counters
    > did not realize how important research was (as contrasted to short-term
    > product development) and wanted to close it down to improve short term
    > profits. Now RCA is no more. They had to get out of the computer
    > business even though they knew it was their future. They realized that a
    > large proportion of their products were the results of work done in the
    > previous 10 years at Sarnoff, but the bean counters won.


    The entire US consumer electronics industry is no more, why single out
    RCA?

    > >> Getting rid of the 7 operating companies meant getting rid of the high
    > >> cost, labor intensive, regulated, low-profit local telephone service
    > >> part of the business, and keeping Bell Labs, Western Electric, Long
    > >> Lines, the defense business, and so on. These were all capital
    > >> intensive, low labor cost, high profit parts of the business. They would
    > >> also get rid of a lot of the overhead and excess management of running
    > >> the operating companies, so the remaining management could take care of
    > >> running the remaining business.

    > >
    > > Except that they were not allowed to keep Western Electric or Bell Labs.

    >
    > AT&T was allowed to keep Western Electric and Bell Labs. And they did
    > keep both until years later when they spun off Verizon, and Verizon got
    > them. That did not work out well and Alcatel bought Verizon, and now
    > Alcatel is not doing well.
    >
    > > And they lost their monopoly on long-distance as well which meant that
    > > their resources were far less than they had been.
    > >
    > >> And the Operating Companies also messed up their opportunity. Bell Labs
    > >> was split into two parts, one retained by AT&T, and one jointly owned by
    > >> the 7 operating companies (BellCore).

    > >
    > > How was this an "opportunity"?

    >
    > BellCore could have dumped the unwhieldy G.E.I, streamlined management,
    > and managed the company. They could have become the leaders they once
    > were back when AT&T was well managed by people like Vail. But instead
    > they got Charlie Brown and Robert Allen.


    How could they "become the leaders" when the entire structure of the
    company had been destroyed by the government and all that was left to
    them was to compete for long distance?

    > >> BellCore could have cut the
    > >> thickness of one 6 or 7 inch thick book of rules and regulations to
    > >> about 2 inches (The G.E.I.), but they did not. They had all the same bad
    > >> management as the AT&T part had. And since the operating companies did
    > >> not manufacture anything, they had trouble supporting BellCore
    > >> financially since they could not justify it to all the Public Utility
    > >> Commissions. So they didn't support it. I do not know if BellCore even
    > >> exists anymore. There are descendants of descendants of BellCore but
    > >> just as the present AT&T has little in common with the old one, the
    > >> present descendant has little to do with communication research.

    > >
    > > And all due to the lawsuit.
    > >
    > > Every single "problem" you list is the result of the actions of MCI's
    > > lawyers.
    > >
    > >
    > >
    > >

    >
    > Nonsense. They played a part, but AT&T would have fallen apart
    > regardless. It might have taken a little longer.


    Perhaps it would, perhaps it wouldn't. We'll never know because it was
    destroyed by the lawyers.

    Note that AT&T is still around. The bastards that sued them aren't.
     
    J. Clarke, May 10, 2013
    #36
  17. Dale

    J. Clarke Guest

    In article <>,
    says...
    >
    > J. Clarke:
    >
    > > > > I think your scanner is busticated. It looks
    > > > > like the green on the left side of that shot
    > > > > is way, way out of register.
    > > >
    > > > This has nothing to do with the scanner itself.
    > > > [...]

    > >
    > > So what? Your discussioin of color spaces has
    > > nothing to do with anything that I said or with
    > > the problem I see in that image.

    >
    > I thought that the defect you talk about is that of
    > the scanner software rather than hardware. What do
    > you mean by "out of register"?


    Look on the left side of the picture. You'll see a stick. Look
    closely. You'll see the green part of the image of that stick displaced
    far enough from the red and green that there is a visible gap between
    them. That's not a software problem.
     
    J. Clarke, May 10, 2013
    #37
  18. Dale

    J. Clarke Guest

    In article <>, says...
    >
    > PeterN <> wrote:
    > >On 5/8/2013 10:45 PM, Jean-David Beyer wrote:
    > >> On 05/08/2013 04:49 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > >>> In article <79bf218c-4aab-4dce-8f0c-
    > >>> >, says...
    > >>>>
    > >>>> On May 7, 12:48 pm, Bowser <> wrote:
    > >>>
    > >>> Bell was not done in by "change", it was done in by lawyers.

    >
    > The Bell System was "done in" by the major shifts in the
    > economic model of the telecommunications business
    > brought about by new technologies.
    >
    > Lawyers are merely the people who deal with the result
    > of such problems, not the cause.


    Filing a lawsuit against AT*T so that MCI could make more profits is not
    a "result".
     
    J. Clarke, May 10, 2013
    #38
  19. On 05/10/2013 12:28 AM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > They bought stuff from China
    > and wondered why Western Electric (later spun into Lucent) had trouble
    > selling stuff.
    >>> "Selling stuff" was a small part of their business.

    >> Selling stuff was the Entire business of Western Electric. They sold all
    >> the equipment the operating companies used except maybe toilet paper and
    >> Scotch Tape. Central Offices, PBXs, telephones, wire, ...

    > After the lawsuit.
    >

    Balony. They sold stuff even before they were purchased by AT&T way back
    in the fogs of time.
    That was Western Electric's only reason for existance (except for
    defense contracting military systems such as the M-33 fire control
    system, the Nike missile systems, Safeguard anti-ballistic missile
    system, ...). AT&T did not keep them around as a hobby. They made all
    the equipment used by the 22 operating companies for most of a century.
    > Do tell us about the computer that AT&T made before WWII.


    http://history-computer.com/ModernComputer/Relays/Stibitz.html
    >
    >> They made of the first transistorized computers. About that time,
    >> in an earlier case, the Justice Department made them stop making
    >> computers, and the teams working on them were broken up, partly by mass
    >> resignations of people who went to work for independent computer
    >> manufacturers.


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRADIC

    >>>> They chose National Cash Register, not because they made great
    >>>> computers, but because they were cheap. After a few years of mismanaging
    >>>> NCR, they spun it off at half the price they paid for it because they
    >>>> had messed it up so bad. The Sadim touch (opposite of Midas), where
    >>>> everything they touched turned to $hit.
    >>>>
    >>>> I am saying (now; I did not say this in my post) that losing that
    >>>> lawsuit was a really great opportunity for the AT&T, and they wasted
    >>>> that opportunity completely.
    >>> Only if you want them to be something other than what they were, the
    >>> telephone company.

    >> They were much much more than a telephone company.

    > They were the telephone company. That was their core competency.


    My father can lick your father.
    >
    >> They engaged in much
    >> fundamental research only tangentially related to telephones. For
    >> example, Davisson and Germer's discovery that electrons were both waves
    >> and particles (Nobel prize in physics), Ives' discovery of retardation
    >> of atomic clocks, invention of transistor instead of just making better
    >> telephone relays, ...

    > A couple of posts earlier you said they neglected research. You're
    > talking out of both sides of your mouth here.
    >
    >

    That company was in business over 100 years. The deterioration, as it
    seemed to me at the time, started in the early 1970s, although it
    probably was already happening at the time of the Carterphone decision.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carterfone

    For decades, they were possibly the premier technical research
    laboratory in the world. For decades, they were getting a patent a day.
    And 13 Nobel prizes. They did not get them for the Princess telephone.

    From about 1925 until I left at the end of 1989, the Bell Labs
    presidents had a pretty good idea of the importance of basic research,
    for example. Problems ensued when AT&T and Western Electric (joint
    owners of Bell Labs) got too interested in short-term development and
    did not understand that basic research was the future. Bell Labs'
    charter ensured that both basic research and product development were
    done. It is my impression that basic research was about 10% of what was
    done there, and development was around 75% or so. Then in the 1980s,
    some badly understood work was started on a huge scale, gobbling up
    resources including management attention. President of Bell Labs was a
    big deal until about then, but the bean counters at AT&T did not
    understand research (or even development, actually), and things went to
    hell.

    Think about the economy of the United States and how Bell Labs affected
    it. If Brattain, Bardeen, and Shockley had been told to design better
    relay contacts, and if they did not quit, they would have designed
    better relay contacts. Instead, they were interested in the physics of
    the solid state. What has that to do with telephones? They just invented
    the transistor, that's all. It is true that AT&T never made a success at
    manufacturing transistors, but companies like Texas Instruments,
    Fairchild, RCA, Philco, and a few others made a success of it. Changed
    the economy of the whole world. Now there is a computer in my cell
    phone, several computers in my car, ... . That cell phone has more
    compute power than the IBM 704 I first used in the late 1950s that cost
    $680/ an hour to rent and required two trained operators per shift to
    run it.
     
    Jean-David Beyer, May 10, 2013
    #39
  20. Dale

    J. Clarke Guest

    In article <>, says...
    >
    > "J. Clarke" <> wrote:
    > >In article <>, says...
    > >>
    > >> PeterN <> wrote:
    > >> >On 5/9/2013 12:48 AM, J. Clarke wrote:
    > >> >> So you're saying that the MCI lawsuit that resulted in the breakup of
    > >> >> AT&T into 7 different companies and forced the divestiture of Western
    > >> >> Electric and Bell Labs was not the major factor in the decline of AT&T?
    > >> >>
    > >> >
    > >> >See my prior post. It was not. The problem is when you
    > >> >put money into research and development, it adversely
    > >> >impacts the bottom line, for accounting purposes. Lower
    > >> >bottom line = lower bonuses for management.
    > >>
    > >> Neither of those descriptions relate to the history of AT&T.
    > >>
    > >> Think "Information Age". In 1940 it was a company based
    > >> on the economics of message traffic. By 1960 there were
    > >> predictions on when revenue from message traffic would
    > >> drop below revenue from byte oriented data traffic.
    > >>
    > >> Corporate AT&T was frozen and unable to respond to the
    > >> changes that occured as those predictions became true.
    > >>
    > >> Literally within months of the day the data traffic
    > >> revenues rose above message traffic revenues the AT&T
    > >> Board of Directors threw in the towel, disolved the
    > >> company as it existed, sold off the parts, and went
    > >> home.

    > >
    > >Now that is a fine piece of revisionism.

    >
    > It is history, and a fact. Look it up.
    >
    > What it also is, is relatively unknown. There are
    > probably very few people outside of the telecom industry
    > that were even aware of that change in revenue
    > generation, and of course the predictions and tracking
    > of it were and are proprietary information that was not
    > typically divulged outside of AT&T.
    >
    > But if you carefully look at changes made by the Board
    > of Directors in the 1990's, particularly with new CEO's,
    > every single change was intended to shift executive
    > management away from the corporate culture that saw
    > message traffic as the source of all operating revenue
    > (which had been the very basis of the Bell System
    > monopoly prior to Judge Green's ruling).
    >
    > None of those selected from within the company were able
    > to redirect a staid and entrenched management. So they
    > went outside the company. And what they learned was that
    > it just wasn't possible.


    So you're saying that somehow MCI just conveniently filed suit and the
    Justice Department conveniently ruled on exactly the scheduled that AT&T
    wanted?
     
    J. Clarke, May 10, 2013
    #40
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