«

Per john reves:
>Thanks. Of course this is about avoiding local government authorities
>detecting locally calls in the middle east. **Not** authorities in the
>U.K.

I don't claim any real knowledge, but looking at it from the
outside:

- I'd think 256-bit DES encryption would be tb quite a challenge
for anybody except the USA NSA.

- Whether somebody can break the encryption on a phone call or
not might be moot: I'd worry about them coming to get me just
because they found out that my calls were encrypted.
--
PeteCresswell

On 02/26/2011 11:18 PM, john reves wrote:
> "William Black"<> wrote in message
> news:ikb7c9$qp5$...
>> On 02/26/2011 08:48 PM, Theo Markettos wrote:
>>> In uk.telecom.voip William Black<> wrote:
>>>> Don't be silly.
>>>>
>>>> If a UK government intelligence agency gets a warrant they can listen to
>>>> you if they feel like it.
>>>>
>>>> Trying to avoid them is expensive and probably futile.
>>>
>>> Various satphones will take input from STU-III encrypted phones, if
>>> you're
>>> that paranoid (and can find one).
>>
>> The reason STU-II and STU-III are available on the open market is because
>> the governments no longer use them.
>>
>> Can you guess why?
>>
>> Otherwise another kind of end to end
>>> encrpytion will do... I don't think you're going to get very far with
>>> something that breaks out into an unencrypted landline or mobile. Use a
>>> satphone if you're suspect of the local infrastructure. (Though that
>>> will
>>> broadcast your position and ciphertext to everyone listening)
>>
>> And may get you locked up. In a lot of 3rd World countries they're
>> illegal to own or operate without some sort of government permit.
>>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Thanks. Of course this is about avoiding local government authorities
> detecting locally calls in the middle east. **Not** authorities in the
> U.K.

So, what do we know?

We know from their repeated attempts to get Skype banned that the Indian
police agencies cannot listen to Skype telephone calls.

That being the case it's a fair bet than anyone with a less
sophisticated intelligence set-up can't either.

On the other hand we also know that during the attack on the Taj Hotel
in 2008 the US authorities (assume the NSA) were more or less feeding
the Indian authorities with intercepts of the VoIP communications of the
terrorists with their base in Pakistan in real time.

--
William Black

"Any number under six"

The answer given by Englishman Richard Peeke when asked by the Duke of
Medina Sidonia how many Spanish sword and buckler men he could beat
single handed with a quarterstaff.

On 02/27/2011 02:38 AM, wrote:
> In uk.telecom.mobile Denis McMahon<> wrote:
>> On 26/02/11 12:35, john reves wrote:
>>> With recent political troubles in the middle east someone in the U.K. would
>>> like to make
>>> ** Secure ** telephone calls to arrange evacuation of persons who would be a
>>> very likely target for hostage takers.
>>>
>>> What would experts suggest using out of these various alternatives available
>>> to them? A direct BT line, The 18185 indirect secondary service on that BT
>>> line, the internet voip connection service, 'Voip Stunt' and an Asda 'pay as
>>> you go' mobile connection.
>>>
>>> Security and privacy of conversation without any remaining local government
>>> or security services listening in would be more important than cost.
>>
>> If your far end party wants to avoid locals overhearing their plans,
>> they could use skype over an ssh connection to an out of country proxy.
>>
>> Of course, doing so may draw attention to them, as the encrypted traffic
>> stream will be visible, and it's endpoints can be determined, if not the
>> content.
>>
>> Note, however, that unless you have already exchanged ssh encryption
>> keys, this is pointless, as setting up the ssh connection without
>> existing keys will involve a key exchange which can be intercepted.
>>
>> The same really applies to any such scheme, unless you arranged it
>> already, it's too late to set it up when you actually need to use it.
>>
> Unless you're being watched continuously then simply splitting the key
> into bits and sending them separately will probably help.

You assume a sleeping signals intelligence organisation here.

Key management isn't something you can make up on the spot...

> Alternatively converse in chinese, or polish or something, probably
> just as effective.

Now that really is the road to dusty death, as the British found out in
Korea when they tried that trick with Ghurkali...

Signals intelligence organisations always employ those peculiar people
who can speak and understand thirty or forty languages.

Whose life are you willing to bet?






--
William Black

"Any number under six"

The answer given by Englishman Richard Peeke when asked by the Duke of
Medina Sidonia how many Spanish sword and buckler men he could beat
single handed with a quarterstaff.

On 27/02/11 02:40, (PeteCresswell) wrote:
> Per john reves:
>> Thanks. Of course this is about avoiding local government authorities
>> detecting locally calls in the middle east. **Not** authorities in the
>> U.K.
>
> I don't claim any real knowledge, but looking at it from the
> outside:
>
> - I'd think 256-bit DES encryption would be tb quite a challenge
> for anybody except the USA NSA.
>
> - Whether somebody can break the encryption on a phone call or
> not might be moot: I'd worry about them coming to get me just
> because they found out that my calls were encrypted.

Indeed, sigint might not be up to the realtime decryption, but the
presence of encrypted traffic might in itself be seen as a "hostile" action.

Rgds

Denis McMahon

On 02/27/2011 10:23 PM, Denis McMahon wrote:
> On 27/02/11 02:40, (PeteCresswell) wrote:
>> Per john reves:
>>> Thanks. Of course this is about avoiding local government authorities
>>> detecting locally calls in the middle east. **Not** authorities in the
>>> U.K.
>>
>> I don't claim any real knowledge, but looking at it from the
>> outside:
>>
>> - I'd think 256-bit DES encryption would be tb quite a challenge
>> for anybody except the USA NSA.
>>
>> - Whether somebody can break the encryption on a phone call or
>> not might be moot: I'd worry about them coming to get me just
>> because they found out that my calls were encrypted.
>
> Indeed, sigint might not be up to the realtime decryption, but the
> presence of encrypted traffic might in itself be seen as a "hostile" action.

And never forget that Loony Gadaffi may be as mad as a hatter, but he's
also a product of the officers course at Garats Hay, the old (now
closed) UK Royal Signals Intelligence Training School.

--
William Black

"Any number under six"

The answer given by Englishman Richard Peeke when asked by the Duke of
Medina Sidonia how many Spanish sword and buckler men he could beat
single handed with a quarterstaff.

On Feb 27, 10:22*am, William Black <blackuse...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 02/27/2011 02:38 AM, tinn...@isbd.co.uk wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > In uk.telecom.mobile Denis McMahon<denis.m.f.mcma...@googlemail.com> *wrote:
> >> On 26/02/11 12:35, john reves wrote:
> >>> With recent political troubles in the middle east someone in the U.K.would
> >>> like to make
> >>> ** Secure ** telephone calls to arrange evacuation of persons who would be a
> >>> very likely target for hostage takers.
>
> >>> What would experts suggest using out of these various alternatives available
> >>> to them? A direct BT line, The 18185 indirect secondary service on that BT
> >>> line, the internet voip connection service, 'Voip Stunt' and an Asda 'pay as
> >>> you go' mobile connection.
>
> >>> Security and privacy of conversation without any remaining local government
> >>> or security services listening in would be more important than cost.
>
> >> If your far end party wants to avoid locals overhearing their plans,
> >> they could use skype over an ssh connection to an out of country proxy..
>
> >> Of course, doing so may draw attention to them, as the encrypted traffic
> >> stream will be visible, and it's endpoints can be determined, if not the
> >> content.
>
> >> Note, however, that unless you have already exchanged ssh encryption
> >> keys, this is pointless, as setting up the ssh connection without
> >> existing keys will involve a key exchange which can be intercepted.
>
> >> The same really applies to any such scheme, unless you arranged it
> >> already, it's too late to set it up when you actually need to use it.
>
> > Unless you're being watched continuously then simply splitting the key
> > into bits and sending them separately will probably help.
>
> You assume a sleeping signals intelligence organisation here.
>
> Key management isn't something you can make up on the spot...
>
> > Alternatively converse in chinese, or polish or something, probably
> > just as effective.
>
> Now that really is the road to dusty death, *as the British found out in
> Korea when they tried that trick with Ghurkali...
>
> Signals intelligence organisations always employ those peculiar people
> who can speak and understand thirty or forty languages.
>
> Whose life are you willing to bet?

Code talkers were quite successful in WWII. Of course, the Navajo code
talkers are the best known, but Choctaw and Basque have also been
used, as well as Welsh by the British Army.

On 02/27/2011 11:34 PM, S wrote:
> On Feb 27, 10:22 am, William Black<blackuse...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 02/27/2011 02:38 AM, tinn...@isbd.co.uk wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> In uk.telecom.mobile Denis McMahon<denis.m.f.mcma...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>>>> On 26/02/11 12:35, john reves wrote:
>>>>> With recent political troubles in the middle east someone in the U.K. would
>>>>> like to make
>>>>> ** Secure ** telephone calls to arrange evacuation of persons who would be a
>>>>> very likely target for hostage takers.
>>
>>>>> What would experts suggest using out of these various alternatives available
>>>>> to them? A direct BT line, The 18185 indirect secondary service on that BT
>>>>> line, the internet voip connection service, 'Voip Stunt' and an Asda 'pay as
>>>>> you go' mobile connection.
>>
>>>>> Security and privacy of conversation without any remaining local government
>>>>> or security services listening in would be more important than cost.
>>
>>>> If your far end party wants to avoid locals overhearing their plans,
>>>> they could use skype over an ssh connection to an out of country proxy.
>>
>>>> Of course, doing so may draw attention to them, as the encrypted traffic
>>>> stream will be visible, and it's endpoints can be determined, if not the
>>>> content.
>>
>>>> Note, however, that unless you have already exchanged ssh encryption
>>>> keys, this is pointless, as setting up the ssh connection without
>>>> existing keys will involve a key exchange which can be intercepted.
>>
>>>> The same really applies to any such scheme, unless you arranged it
>>>> already, it's too late to set it up when you actually need to use it.
>>
>>> Unless you're being watched continuously then simply splitting the key
>>> into bits and sending them separately will probably help.
>>
>> You assume a sleeping signals intelligence organisation here.
>>
>> Key management isn't something you can make up on the spot...
>>
>>> Alternatively converse in chinese, or polish or something, probably
>>> just as effective.
>>
>> Now that really is the road to dusty death, as the British found out in
>> Korea when they tried that trick with Ghurkali...
>>
>> Signals intelligence organisations always employ those peculiar people
>> who can speak and understand thirty or forty languages.
>>
>> Whose life are you willing to bet?
>
> Code talkers were quite successful in WWII. Of course, the Navajo code
> talkers are the best known, but Choctaw and Basque have also been
> used, as well as Welsh by the British Army.

Only in very localised circumstances in tactical use.

When the USAAF tried the Choctaw trick over Germany twice they found
that on the second use the Germans had dug up an elderly linguistics
professor who spoke the language and they got shot to bits...

--
William Black

"Any number under six"

The answer given by Englishman Richard Peeke when asked by the Duke of
Medina Sidonia how many Spanish sword and buckler men he could beat
single handed with a quarterstaff.

"john reves" <> wrote in message
news:ikas2p$qv8$...
>
> With recent political troubles in the middle east someone in the U.K.
> would like to make
> ** Secure ** telephone calls to arrange evacuation of persons who would be
> a very likely target for hostage takers.
>
> What would experts suggest using out of these various alternatives
> available to them? A direct BT line, The 18185 indirect secondary service
> on that BT line, the internet voip connection service, 'Voip Stunt' and an
> Asda 'pay as you go' mobile connection.
>
> Security and privacy of conversation without any remaining local
> government or security services listening in would be more important than
> cost.

I would imagine that a satellite phone would be fairly secure. At least from
the local authorities out there.

Paul

On 02/28/2011 01:16 AM, Paulg0 wrote:
>
>
> "john reves" <> wrote in message
> news:ikas2p$qv8$...
>>
>> With recent political troubles in the middle east someone in the U.K.
>> would like to make
>> ** Secure ** telephone calls to arrange evacuation of persons who
>> would be a very likely target for hostage takers.
>>
>> What would experts suggest using out of these various alternatives
>> available to them? A direct BT line, The 18185 indirect secondary
>> service on that BT line, the internet voip connection service, 'Voip
>> Stunt' and an Asda 'pay as you go' mobile connection.
>>
>> Security and privacy of conversation without any remaining local
>> government or security services listening in would be more important
>> than cost.
>
> I would imagine that a satellite phone would be fairly secure. At least
> from the local authorities out there.

But getting caught with one will get you a prison sentence...


--
William Black

"Any number under six"

The answer given by Englishman Richard Peeke when asked by the Duke of
Medina Sidonia how many Spanish sword and buckler men he could beat
single handed with a quarterstaff.

"R. Mark Clayton" <> wrote in message
news...
>
> "john reves" <> wrote in message
> news:ikas2p$qv8$...
>>
>> With recent political troubles in the middle east someone in the U.K.
>> would like to make
>> ** Secure ** telephone calls to arrange evacuation of persons who would
>> be a very likely target for hostage takers.
>
> You mean your uncle Saif?
>
>>
>> What would experts suggest using out of these various alternatives
>> available to them? A direct BT line, The 18185 indirect secondary service
>> on that BT line, the internet voip connection service, 'Voip Stunt' and
>> an Asda 'pay as you go' mobile connection.
>>
>> Security and privacy of conversation without any remaining local
>> government or security services listening in would be more important than
>> cost.
>>
> General
>
> I assume leakage at this end (where-ever that is) is not an issue; In the
> UK, GCHQ routinely listen in to anything RF they like and under RIPA the
> local dog warden can legally tap your landline. The international network
> is quite secure too, with only perhaps China and the USA able to seriously
> distort traffic to be sure of interception. The big problem is the local
> PTT which is often a branch of the local secret police (Iran, Libya etc.).
> In all cases use the sheer volume of traffic to make interception
> difficult (the best place to hide is in a crowd).
>
> The main options are: -
>
> 1. Inmarasat [with encryption]
>
> Advantages - geographically difficult to find due to satellite dish being
> directional.
> Network Secure, but downlink receivable by anyone.
> Disadvantages - expensive, needs aligned dish.
>
> Improve security - use bigger dish (narrower beam angle), hide it in a
> hole or drive out into the desert to use it..
>
> 2. Thuruya
>
> Advantages - does not (or should not) pass through local telecoms
> infrastructure
> Issues - now based in UAE, network might be compromised
> Disadvantages - expensive, may be possible to DF and locate, but keep
> calls short etc. and it should be OK.
>
> Improve security - don't display the phone, stay offline when not in use.
>
> 3. In net VOIP with encryption
>
> Advantages - cheap, probably just a soft phone
> Disadvantages - Needs IP connection, easily read by local PTT, encryption
> may instigate interest, local end can be located. Fails when local PTT
> pulls the plug, as has happened in many countries.
> Improve security - use a different PC and connection each time. Use a
> [public] wi-fi connection and then connect a headset or mobile to the
> laptop via Bluetooth. If you can skip the encryption then SIP enabled
> phones (e.g. recent Nokias) can make VOIP calls directly over wi-fi (no
> GSM transmission and IMEI not broadcast). Use a new account each time.
>
> 4. Buy a local (or third country) PAYG phone and call it from another.
>
> Advantages - cheap (not the calls though), portable, inconspicuous
> Issues - call interceptable, however the local PTT will have problems
> sorting the wheat from the chaff
> Disadvantages - Fails when local PTT turns off net, as has happened in
> many countries.
>
> Improve security - only switch on to make calls, use in different busy
> location each time. Get phones on the same service provider and then
> there is more chance calls will route in over private networks.
>
> 5. Landline
>
> Advantages - cheap and there are lots of them
> Disadvantages - routinely tapped by dodgy regimes, traceable.
>
> Improve security - only make arranged calls to / from public call offices
> or say cafes or restaurants at set times. If receiving calls use a TAM to
> see if line compromised.

That's an interesting list of options there that you've suggested.

Another option is an encrypted data radio link using HF radio (between 3 -
30MHz). Signal propagation between the UK and Libya should be reasonable
for much of the day as long as you use an appropriate part of the HF
spectrum. The problem here is that it's easy to direction find if you are
within ground wave range of the transmitter). Plus you would need an
appropriate licence to use that part of the radio spectrum from both the UK
and Libyan authorities if it's being used for a 2-way link.

I think this is only a last resort option to be honest and is probably not a
very sensible suggestion.