Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
> In message <3hgov3->, thingy wrote:
>
>> http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/...25720100308517
>
> This caught my eye:
>
> SetSlice chews through a hole in the WebViewFolderIcon ActiveX control
[...]
> Contrast this with the speed with which Microsoft was able to rush out the
> patch to plug the DRM hole in Windows Media Player
> <http://www.wired.com/news/columns/0,71738-0.html> -- just three days. And
> you can see where Microsoft's priorities lie--with the security of itself
> and its biggest business/revenue partners, not with most of its customers.
No particular barrow to push, but the SetSlice PoC 2 months ago crashed
IE - didn't allow for remote code execution.
http://www.avertlabs.com/research/blog/?p=98
Remote code execution appeared at the end of Sept ..though that doesn't
lessen the risk now for unmanaged WinX hosts.
Managed Win2k sp4+ hosts have no infection excuse.
# AD / ieak / your script language of choice lets you disable all / some
or when activex controls run (if IE is needed).
That helps you at day 0.5 when the bug appears as a faint radar trace.
# To reduce the '0day' exposure - no user on a managed desktop should
run with admin rights (well, any, but that's another discussion).
Bad app only works as admin? don't be lazy - track where it breaks. If
the vendor is a useless noddy, only then do you push elevated rights to
required reg keys / specific files to that app user group via gpo.
In a perfect world, this would occur at the evaluation stage before
purchase. In the real world, it can be time consuming and frustrating.
It is definitely worth doing.
# Safer(MS) - even with restricted users, you can run specific apps with
lower privs at start. That would be at least IE, WMP and MS Office main
executables
# XPsp2 (possibly sp1a?) - use the firewall in domain mode to limit the
spread of network-aware nasties. Use software dep (with your exceptions)
- or h/w dep if supported.
Track your apps, feed port requirements into fw rules. Partition the
network - fw / vlan / etc.
Usual stuff about best practice layered defence et al - regardless of
whether the environment is heterogeneous or homogeneous.
For all the (sometimes misplaced) huff & puff in the article, there's
very little new in principle.
Doesn't matter what's being run - end point security has always been
important - and we've been familiar with rapidly spreading nasties using
low visibility exploits since the Morris worm.
My 10c - apparently I can't use the 5c piece any more.
/C